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Death closes the decedent's final income tax year.' Only gross
income determined under the decedent's method of accounting is
taxed in his final return.2 Returns of cash method decedents include
income they actually or constructively received;3 returns of accrual
method taxpayers include income they had a fixed right to receive, the
amount of which can be determined with reasonable accuracy.4
Amounts not taxable in decedents' final returns, however, do not
escape income taxation by reason of death if they constitute items of
gross income in respect of a decedent (IRD).5
Income in respect of a decedent is the concept Congress enacted to
tax earned, but untaxed, amounts that would have been included in
decedents' gross incomes had they lived. IRD is gross income to
decedents' successors6 under the rules currently set forth in the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 691. 7 Although the right to
receive an item of IRD constitutes property for local law purposes,
the general rule of section 1014 that property acquired from a
decedent receives a new basis equal to its estate tax value8 does not
apply to items of income in respect of a decedent. 9 Section 691
income in respect of a decedent and section 1014 property are
mutually exclusive categories. 10
1. I.R.C. §§ 441(b)(3), 443(a)(2). All references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 as amended and in effect as of the date of this article unless otherwise indicated.
2. Id. § 451(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1993).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
4. Id.
5. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(14), 691.
6. In this article "decedents' successors" refers to the persons taxable on income in respect of
a decedent under section 691(a)(1). The code provides that a successor is:
(A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is acquired by the
decedent's estate from the decedent;
(B) the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the right to
receive the amount, if the right to receive the amount is not acquired by the decedent's
estate from the decedent; or
(C) the person who acquires from the decedent the right to receive the amount by
bequest, devise, or inheritance, if the amount is received after a distribution by the
decedent's estate of such right.
I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
7. The income in respect of a decedent rules were first enacted in section 134 of the Revenue
Act of 1942 as I.R.C. § 126. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 134, 56 Stat., pt. 1, 798, 830-34. For
purposes of consistency, references in this article to the applicable statute will generally be to
section 691, even though section 126 governed taxation at the time under discussion.
8. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
9. Id. § 1014(c).
10. Id. § 1014(c); Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1961); H.R.
REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, at 436; S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 101
(1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, at 580.
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Property which constitutes income in respect of a decedent is
potentially subject to double taxation. Not only will it be subject to
income taxation after death, but its date of death fair market value
will usually" be included in the decedent's gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes. 12 Double taxation does not always result,
however, because items need not be included in the gross estate in
order to constitute IRD13 and, even if included, the amounts subject
to taxation may differ.' 4 In order to furnish some relief from double
taxation, Congress provided to the person required to include IRD in
income a deduction for federal estate tax attributable to the IRD.' 5
Income in respect of a decedent issues should be considered both
before and after death.' 6 Before death, assets should be classified as
either property entitled to a section 1014 basis or as income in respect
of a decedent. Once identified, planning can be undertaken to
minimize potential taxes. For example, appreciated property that
would be entitled to a section 1014 basis could be retained until death
to receive the favorable basis adjustment. Actions that would convert
such property into an item of income in respect of a decedent, such as
an installment sale, could be avoided. On the other hand, if an IRD
item is already owned, it could be specifically devised to several lower
tax bracket beneficiaries to reduce the eventual income tax burden.
After death, identification of income in respect of a decedent is
necessary to lessen its income taxation under the IRD rules. While
IRD is not generally included in income until payment is received,17
the transfer of the right to receive IRD may accelerate taxation.' 8 For
example, funding a pecuniary devise with a right to receive an item of
IRD causes recognition of income without producing cash with which
11. I.R.C. § 2031. The executor, however, may elect to value assets at other than date of
death in certain estates under section 2032 or to value certain property at other than fair market
value under section 2032A.
12. See id. §§ 2033-2044.
13. See John S. Brown, Income in Respect of a Decedent, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 211, 216 n.34
(1970).
14. Since the amount of income in' respect of a decedent subject to income tax generally
depends on the amount actually received after death, the amount subject to income tax may be
less than, equal to, or greater than the amount included in a decedent's gross estate. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.691(a)-(5)(c) (as amended in 1965).
15. I.R.C. § 691(c).
16. See M. CARR FERGUSON ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND
BENEFICIARIES, 3:128-132 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1996) (discussing various ways to minimize the
tax consequences of income in respect of a decedent); Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Income in
Respect of a Decedent, 12 PROB. NOTES 47, 51-53 (1986).
17. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
18. Id. § 691(a)(2).
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to pay the tax. 19 On the other hand, an estate's distribution of the
right to receive IRD to a residuary devisee will not accelerate taxation
and may shift future income taxation to lower tax bracket taxpayers. 20
Since identification of income in respect of a decedent is essential to
its proper taxation, it would seem that Congress would have carefully
defined the term to include all items it intended to tax and to exclude
items that were to receive a new basis under section 1014. It did not.
Although Treasury Regulations contain a general definition2' and
several examples22 of income in respect of a decedent, the task of
determining the meaning of the term has fallen to the courts.2 3
The courts, unfortunately, have expounded alternative and
inconsistent tests for identifying income in respect of a decedent. The
articulated tests are confounding, moreover, because courts have at
times decided cases on the basis of the statutory language and at other
times on policy grounds. No universal test has yet been announced;
nor can one be devised because of the variety of settings in which
income in respect of a decedent can arise.24 Almost every item of
gross income under section 61 can constitute income in respect of a
decedent.2 5 Courts, in deciding whether a particular item is IRD,
have considered factors deemed pertinent to characterization of the
particular item at issue.
19. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
20. I.RC. § 691(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(b)(2) (1957).
21. The regulations provide:
(b) General definition. In general, the term "income in respect of a decedent" refers to
those amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross income but which were not
properly includible in computing his taxable income for the taxable year ending with
the date of his death or for a previous taxable year under the method of accounting
employed by the decedent. See the regulations under section 451. Thus, the term
includes-
(1) All accrued income of a decedent who reported his income by use of the cash
receipts and disbursements method;
(2) Income accrued solely by reason of the decedent's death in case of a decedent
who reports his income by use of an accrual method of accounting; and
(3) Income to which the decedent had a contingent claim at the time of his death.
See sections 736 and 753 and the regulations thereunder for "income in respect of a
decedent" in the case of a deceased partner.
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1965).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) (1957).
23. See, e.g., Rollert Residuary Trust v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 619, 629 (1983), aff d, 752 F.2d
1128 (6th Cir. 1985); Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 630, 638 (1980), affd, 667 F.2d
675 (8th Cir. 1981).
24. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 910 (N.D. Ga. 1966), affd, 392 F.2d 694 (5th
Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
25. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1954).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
An integral part of federal income tax law is the judicially
developed donative assignment of income doctrine. 26 While the
I.R.C. defines "gross income" in section 61, it does not specifically
identify the taxpayer who must pay tax on the income.27 Courts,
under section 61 and its precursors, determined that "gross income"
includes the notion that income is to be taxed to a particular taxpayer,
the one who earned it, and that assignment of the right to receive
income is ineffective to shift its taxation to another.28 The doctrine
protects the progressive federal income tax against transfers intended
to reduce the overall tax burden.
When Congress enacted the income in respect of a decedent rules in
1942, the assignment of income doctrine was well established.
Landmark Supreme Court decisions which delineated important
parameters of the doctrine had been decided in the twelve years
preceding enactment.29 Congress, no doubt aware of the assignment
of income cases, enacted section 691 to tax "gross income in respect of
a decedent." The new statutory scheme provided rules to tax income
assigned at death, just as the assignment of income doctrine provided
rules to tax income assigned during life.
Considered in this context, the lack of a statutory definition of
income in respect of a decedent emerges as a deliberate legislative
decision rather than an unfortunate oversight. Congress, except in a
limited number of areas,30 has not attempted to codify the
circumstances that trigger the assignment of income doctrine. By
using the nebulous term "gross income in respect of a decedent,"
Congress implicitly relied upon the courts to give content to the
phrase in a manner consistent with good tax policy 3' and fundamental
principles of federal income taxation.32
26. See generally James S. Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-
The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REV. 1 (1964); Charles S. Lyon & James S. Eustice, Assignment of
Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1962); Lloyd G.
Soil, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income, 6 TAX L. REV. 435
(1951).
27. See Soil, supra note 26, at 435.
28. Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1956).
29. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122
(1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Blair
v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930).
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (grantor trusts); id. § 704 (family partnerships).
31. See Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1024, 1032 (1952).
32. See Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX
REV. 492, 509 (1995) (suggesting that "Congress often uses the best words that it could have
chosen in the situation to capture an idea-'capital expenditure,' 'cost,' 'gift,'-but the words
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Judicial inability to adequately define income in respect of a
decedent or to develop a universally applicable test is a result of the
general failure of judges33 to recognize that donative assignment of
income and income in respect of a decedent cases involve a common
inquiry-whether the item transferred was "earned" income or
property. The character of the item transferred and the status of
ongoing transactions must be considered in making that
determination in both contexts. Courts should acknowledge that
income in respect of a decedent can be identified by using the same
factors used in donative assignment of income cases and identify IRD
by reference to, and in a manner consistent with, the substantial body
of donative assignment of income case law.
The history of taxation of decedents' earned, but untaxed, income
at death is reviewed in Part I. The scope of income in respect of a
decedent is addressed in Part II. Judicial efforts to identify income in
respect of a decedent are discussed in Part III. The case for
identifying income in respect of a decedent by reference to donative
assignment of income precedents is made in Part IV. Taxation of
selected items transferred during life and at death is compared in
Part V.
I. THE STATUTORY HISTORY
A. Pre-1934
In the early days of federal income taxation, amounts not actually
or constructively received by cash method taxpayers during their lives
entirely escaped income taxation at death.34 Deceased individuals
and their estates were then,35 as they are now,36 separate entities for
federal income tax purposes. Amounts that cash taxpayers had
earned during their lives were not includible in their final returns ab-
sent actual or constructive receipt, nor were such amounts income to
their estates or successors when received because they were consid-
nevertheless cannot be given meaning without resort to the larger statutory structure of an
income tax") (citations omitted).
33. Several judges have recognized that assignment of income and income in respect of a
decedent are related and that precedent in one line of cases is relevant in deciding cases in the
other. See, e.g., Tatum v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 242, 247 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 890, 896 (1976) (Tannewald, J., dissenting in part).
34. Kemper v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 931, 933 (1928) (salary and bonuses); Heller v. Com-
missioner, 10 B.T.A. 53, 56 (1928) (accrued interest and rent); Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct.
Cl. 241, 245 (1927) (partnership income); Frank v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1071, 1072 (1927)
(accrued interest); Held v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 408, 408 (1926) (salary).
35. Nichols, 64 Ct. Cl. at 245.
36. See I.R.C. § 6012; Biewer v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 394, 396 (6th Cir. 1965).
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ered corpus. 37 Although Congress had expressly exempted only un-
realized appreciation of property from post-death income taxation by
the predecessor of section 1014, exclusion of items otherwise taxable
was "purely the unanticipated result of principles of general estate
law." 38
Accrual basis taxpayers, however, received less favorable income
tax treatment at death. Amounts properly accrued under their
method of accounting were taxed in their final returns, regardless of
receipt.39 Only income not properly accrued, such as amounts as to
which the decedent had only a contingent right or which were indeter-
minable with reasonable accuracy, escaped income taxation upon the
death of accrual method taxpayers.
B. 1934-1942
In 1934, Congress acted to eliminate the loss of revenue caused by
the death of cash method taxpayers. 40 It amended section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code to require that amounts "accrued" up to the
date of death, if not otherwise includible in a return for the decedent,
be included in the decedent's final return.41 Congress also provided
that deductions accrued to the date of death, not otherwise properly
allowable to the decedent, were to be allowed in the decedent's final
return.42
Congress, however, did not define "accrued" in the statute, nor did
the legislative history disclose an intended meaning for the term dif-
ferent from its meaning under other code sections.43 Determination
of whether an item was accrued, however, was critical to the applica-
tion of the statute. That question, moreover, was a mixed question of
fact, law, and accounting practice.44 No single accrual system existed45
and accrual had no generally accepted meaning. 46 Although two re-
37. Heller, 10 B.T.A. at 56; Nichols, 64 Ct. CI. at 245.
38. Abraham S. Guterman, New Problems Under Section 126 in Income and Estate Taxes, 24
TAXES 633, 633 (1946).
39. Id. at 634.
40. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 24 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 572; S. REP. No. 73-558,
at 28 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 586, 608.
41. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat., pt. 1, 680, 694 (1934).
42. Id. § 43.
43. Stephen M. Farrand & Knox Farrand, Treatment of Accrued Items in the Event of the
Death of a Taxpayer, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 437 (1940).
44. Charles C. Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. PA. L. REV.
295, 302 (1939).
45. Id. at 301.
46. Farrand & Farrand, supra note 43, at 438; Note, Income Accrued to a Decedent Partner
Under the Federal Revenue Acts, 50 YALE L.J. 170, 172-73 (1941).
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quirements for accrual could be identified under the "all events test"
(a right to receive income the amount of which could be determined
with reasonable accuracy), 47 section 42 appeared to require creation
of an accrual method of taxation for taxpayers for whom the concept
was entirely new.48
The legislative history suggested that the 1934 amendments would
only affect cash method taxpayers and place them on the accrual
method at death.49 The gap in the cash method that permitted cash
method decedents to escape taxation on accrued income was thereby
closed.50 Although section 42 was not limited to cash method taxpay-
ers, nothing in the legislative history suggested that the new provisions
would alter taxation of accrual basis decedents.5 1 The problem Con-
gress had identified was that income of cash basis taxpayers was es-
caping taxation at death.52 No loss-of-revenue-at-death problem
appears to have been perceived in the case of accrual basis taxpayers
whose final returns already included income accrued to death.
Congressional failure to define "accrued" meant that the courts
would determine its meaning. Early decisions interpreted it in a
straightforward, limited manner as merely placing cash method tax-
payers on the accrual method.53 For example, in Fehrman v. Commis-
47. Farrand & Farrand, supra note 43, at 439; Note, Income Accrued to a Decedent Partner
Under the Federal Revenue Acts, supra note 46, at 173.
48. Parlin, supra note 44, at 301.
49. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 24 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 572; S. REP. No. 73-558,
at 28 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 586, 608.
50. Estate of Lambert v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 802,808 (1939). The Board of Tax Appeals
found section 42 to be a reasonable solution to the problem presented by the death of a cash
method taxpayer:
The cash system of accounting is one that has a proper use only where there is a future
period for taxing income received subsequently to the period in which the right to re-
ceive accrues. It is only because of the existence of such future period that the taxing of
the property represented by the accrual is postponed until the actual period of collec-
tion. Thus, where a taxpayer, reporting on a cash basis and deferring the inclusion of
receivables acquired in one year until the future period of their collection, dies, the
possibility of the existence of such future period ceases. One of the conditions support-
ing the use of the cash system is, therefore, then eliminated and such system becomes
no longer applicable to correctly reflect income.
Id.
51. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 24 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 572; S. REP. No. 558, at
28 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 586, 608.
52. Id.
53. Fehrman v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 37, 42 (1938). The board stated:
[Tihe purpose of Congress was to treat the income of a decedent as though he were on
an accrual basis even though he was actually on a cash basis and kept his books on a
cash basis, and that the phrase "amounts accrued up to the date of his death" means
those amounts which would be properly included in a decedent's income if he were on
an accrual basis as distinguished from a cash basis.
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sioner,54 the Board of Tax Appeals held that a cash taxpayer's unpaid
compensation, determined as a percentage of annual profits after his
death, was not "accrued" for purposes of section 42 because the
amount would not have been income in an accrual taxpayer's final
return.55
The period of a limited interpretation of "accrued" ended with the
Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Helvering v. Estate of Enright.56
Enright was a partner in a law firm at the time of his death.5 7 Both
the decedent and the partnership reported income on the cash
method.5 8 The Court had to decide whether the deceased attorney's
final return was to include, as "accrued" income, his share of profits
that had been earned, but not received, by the partnership at the time
of his death.59
The Court, in determining the meaning of "accrued" under section
42, rejected traditional tax accounting meanings 60 as well as a defini-
tion found elsewhere in the code. 61 Although the Court acknowl-
edged the congressional objective of putting cash taxpayers on the
accrual basis, that purpose did not answer the meaning of accrual for
cash taxpayers. 62 The Court concluded that accrual was to be con-
strued to fulfill the congressional intent "to cover into income the as-
sets of decedents, earned during their life and unreported as income,
which on a cash return, would appear in the estate returns. ' 63
The Court held that if the decedent had a right to income that could
be approximately valued, it would be considered "accrued" for pur-
poses of section 42:
The completion of the work in progress was necessary to fix the
amount due but the right to payment for work ordinarily arises on
partial performance. Accrued income under § 42 for uncompleted
operations includes the value of the services rendered by the dece-
Id.; accord Estate of McGlue v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1186, 1193 (1940), rev'd, 119 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1941); Estate of Lambert v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 802, 806 (1939).
54. 38 B.T.A. 37 (1938).
55. Id. at 42.
56. 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
57. Id. at 637-38.
58. Id. at 637.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 643.
61. Id. at 644.
62. Id. ("Accounts kept consistently on a basis other than cash receipts might treat accruals
quite differently from a method designed to reflect the earned income of a cash receipt
taxpayer.").
63. Id. at 644-45.
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dent, capable of approximate valuation, whether based on the
agreed compensation or on quantum meruit. 64
The amounts in Enright met those requirements and were taxable in
the decedent's final return. 65
Enright "gave the word 'accrued' a meaning beyond that generally
used in referring to a taxpayer on the accrual basis. ' 66 It exacerbated
the "bunching" of income problem that was inherent in section 42 af-
ter 1933.67 Although this problem affected both cash and accrual
method taxpayers, it was particularly burdensome for cash method
taxpayers. Not only was all income received by cash method taxpay-
ers taxed in their final returns, but amounts that would not have been
taxed in accrual method taxpayers' final returns under prior law were
taxed in those returns. 68 Accrual caused taxation without receipt of
cash with which to pay the tax and permitted taxation of "amounts
that might never be collected or collected only after many years" 69 at
substantially higher rates.70
C. 1943-Present
Congress responded to Enright7' by repealing the accrual-at-death
provisions and by enacting a new statutory scheme in the Revenue
Act of 1942.72 Thereafter, decedents' final returns were to be pre-
pared as they had been before 1934. In order to insure that accrual
method, as well as cash method, decedents received relief from the
"bunching" problem,73 section 42 was amended to provide that
amounts accrued in accrual taxpayers' final returns (other than
amounts includible by a partner under section 182) solely by reason of
death would not be included in their final returns.74
64. Id. at 645.
65. Id.
66. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1954).
67. Guterman, supra note 38, at 634.
68. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Montclair v. Manning, 196 F.2d 247, 248 (3d Cir.
1952) (holding that a lump sum payment under an employment contract to a deceased em-
ployee's estate was "accrued" under section 42 even though amount would have been paid to the
employee over a nine-year period had he lived); Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167,
169-70 (4th Cir. 1941) (holding that executor fees to which the decedent had a fixed claim but
the amount of which depended on the events that had not occurred were "accrued" under sec-
tion 42).
69. Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 939 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
70. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 907 (N.D. Ga. 1966), affd, 392 F.2d 694 (5th
Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
71. See Estate of Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1958).
72. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 134, 56 Stat., pt. 1, 798, 830-34 (1942).
73. Guterman, supra note 38, at 634.
74. § 134(a), 56 Stat., pt. 1, at 830.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
In place of the accrual-at-death provisions, Congress enacted sec-
tion 126,75 the precursor of section 691, to prevent income from escap-
ing taxation at death. The new section required "[t]he amount of all
items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not properly
includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of his
death or a prior period" to be taxed not to the decedent in his final
return, but to the recipient of the right to receive the income generally
at the time of payment.76 All recipients of IRD were thus put on the
cash method for IRD items regardless of their usual method. Special
rules, however, caused taxation of income in respect of a decedent
before collection in the case of certain transfers of the right to receive
the IRD.77 The character of the income to the successor was to be
determined by reference to the character it would have had in the
decedent's hands had he lived and received it.78
The income in respect of a decedent provisions were made applica-
ble to returns for tax years ending after December 31, 1942.79 But, in
order to provide greater relief from the burdensome provisions of
prior law, Congress made section 126 retroactive to decedents who
died after December 31, 1933, if the estate and the person entitled to
the income consented to be taxed as if provisions corresponding to
those under section 126 had been applicable.80
Section 126 was reenacted, substantially unchanged, as section 691
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.81 Since 1942, Congress has
fine-tuned the statutory scheme on several occasions. For example,
Congress has specifically addressed income in respect of prior dece-
dents,82 installment obligations,83 and application of section 691 in the
case of deceased partners.8 4
II. THE SCOPE OF INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT
When Congress acted in 1942, it did not solve the "bunching" prob-
lem of prior law by simply shifting taxation of section 42's "accrued"
income from decedents' final returns to their successors' returns. It
repealed the accrual-at-death provisions and employed an entirely
75. Id. at 831-32.
76. Id. at 831.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. § 134(f), 56 Stat., pt. 1, at 832.
80. § 134(g), 56 Stat., pt. 1, at 832-34.
81. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691, 68A Stat. 1, 235-38.
82. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
83. Id. § 691(a)(4), (5).
84. Id. § 691(e).
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new concept to address the problem it had identified in 1934. Con-
gress mandated that "all items of gross income in respect of a dece-
dent" be taxed to decedents' successors under a new statutory scheme.
The initial question in the identification of income in respect of a
decedent concerns its scope. Although this issue is related to the
question of how IRD should be identified, it is a distinct, preliminary
question. Only after the congressional purpose is ascertained can the
criteria for identification of IRD be determined.
Three possibilities exist as to the intended scope of gross income in
respect of a decedent. First, IRD might only include amounts that
would have been income to accrual method taxpayers and reported in
their final returns under pre-1934 law (retreat from existing law). Sec-
ond, IRD might only include amounts that would have been "ac-
crued" income under section 42 as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Enright (continuation of existing law). Finally, IRD might include
all amounts of earned, but untaxed, income that would have been in-
come under the decedent's method of accounting had he lived, even if
such amounts would not have been "accrued" under section 42 (ex-
pansion of existing law). Determination of the scope of IRD requires
consideration of the problems to which Congress responded in 1934
and 1942, the statutory language, and the legislative history.
A. Retreat from Existing Law
Congress could have had limited objectives in 1942-eliminate the
"bunching" problem it had created in section 42, prevent income from
escaping taxation at death, and tax cash and accrual basis taxpayers on
substantially the same amount of income. All three objectives could
have been accomplished by taxing successors of deceased cash method
taxpayers on income that would have been included on accrual tax-
payers' final returns under pre-1934 law.85 Section 691, so viewed,
would merely have caused the same amount of income to be taxed in
the case of all decedents, cash and accrual, 86 albeit at different times
and in a different manner.
But if Congress had intended to retreat from the taxation of "ac-
crued" income as broadly construed in Enright, it could have done so
85. See Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at
1027 (suggesting that "[i]f stress is placed on the words 'of a decedent,' it might be taken to refer
merely to amounts which were actually realized by the decedent in the sense that had he been on
the accrual system he would have reported them") (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 1031 ("It is true that nothing in the section can be found which is inconsistent
with the view that its only purpose was to equalize treatment of the cash and accrual-basis
taxpayer.").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
by narrowly defining IRD to achieve that limited objective or by con-
fining section 691 to cash method taxpayers.87 The legislative history,
however, clearly indicates a congressional intent that accrued income
under section 42 continue to be subject to taxation under the new stat-
utory scheme. 88 By taxing "gross income in respect of a decedent," a
term more encompassing than "accrued" income and equally applica-
ble to cash and accrual method taxpayers, Congress clearly rejected a
retreat from existing law.
B. Continuation of Existing Law
Congress could have intended only to solve the "bunching" prob-
lem under prior law and to continue taxing amounts that would have
been "accrued" income under section 42. Some litigants89 and com-
mentators 90 initially suggested that Congress acted in 1942 with these
limited objectives in mind. Implicit in such a position was the ac-
knowledgment that Congress, at a minimum, intended to continue
taxing amounts that had been taxed under prior law.
The legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress intended
to continue taxing income that was considered "accrued" under prior
law in a way that avoided the hardship which resulted "from including
in the income for the decedent's last taxable period amounts which
ordinarily would be receivable over a period of several years." 91 That
history, however, does not necessarily support the conclusion that in-
come in respect of a decedent was to be limited to such amounts. In-
deed, other language in the committee reports suggests that "gross
income in respect of a decedent" was a broader concept than "ac-
crued" income under section 42 and would cause taxation of amounts
that would not have been considered "accrued" under prior law. 92 It
is this latter position that the courts would adopt in their efforts to
87. See id. at 1027.
88. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 435-36; S. REP. No. 77-
1631, at 101 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 579-80.
89. See, e.g., Hess v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Ellis,
264 F.2d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 1959); Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1954).
90. Guterman, supra note 38, at 634; Frank C. Scott, A Critique of Section 126, 26 TAXEs 127,
129 (1948).
91. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 435-36; S. REP. No. 77-
1631, at 101 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 579-80.
92. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 436 ("All amounts of
gross income which are not includible in the income of the decedent will, when received, be
includible in the income of the person receiving such amounts by inheritance or survivorship
from the decedent under section 126."); S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 101 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2
C.B. 504, 580.
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give content to the meaning of "gross income in respect of a
decedent."
C. Expansion of Existing Law
Merely changing the time of taxation and the identity of the tax-
payer for decedent's "accrued" income might not have resulted in the
taxation of all items that Congress believed should be subject to in-
come taxation after death. The Supreme Court in Enright held that
Congress intended to tax amounts that had been "earned" during de-
cedent's life under section 42,93 amounts to which decedent possessed
a right at the time of his death, although the amount was not ascer-
tainable with certainty.94 Contingent amounts, to which decedent pos-
sessed no right, presumably would not have been considered
"accrued" under section 42,95 even though decedent possessed an ex-
pectation that had value.96
The language of section 691 and the statutory scheme suggest a
more encompassing approach to taxing earned, but untaxed, income
transferred at death than simply taxing "accrued" income to which
decedent had a right on his final return.97 Since income in respect of a
decedent is generally not taxed until received by decedent's successor,
perhaps decedent need not have possessed an enforceable right to the
item in order for the post-death receipt to be IRD.98 Statements in
the committee reports that "[a]ll amounts of gross income which are
not includible in the income of the decedent will, when received, be
includible in the income of the person receiving such amounts" 99 sup-
port such a view.100
93. Helvering v. Estate of Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 644-45 (1941).
94. Id. at 645; Kenneth W. Gemmill, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 90
U. PA. L. REV. 702, 704 (1942) ("Here then is the decision of the Enright case-if the decedent
was entitled, at the time of his death, to payment for work done though the amount was not then
fixed, there is an accrual under Section 42.").
95. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1026.
96. See Gemmill, supra note 94, at 705 ("In such case there is no fixed right to payment of any
amount at date of death. Although such an expectancy might have value depending upon one's
appraisal of the case at hand, there is no accrual of income.").
97. See John W. Drye, Jr., The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 TAX L. REV. 203, 210
(1953); Walter D. Freyburger, Employee Benefit Plans-Taxability of Death Benefits, 23 TAXES
962, 966 (1945); Edward N. Polisher, Income in Respect to the Decedent-Its Federal Income and
Estate Tax Implications, 56 DIcK. L. REV. 269, 282 (1952); Note, Income in Respect of Decedents:
The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1026.
98. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1026.
99. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 436; S. REP. No. 77-
1631, at 101 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 580.
100. Polisher, supra note 97, at 274-75. The author concluded:
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An argument in favor of an expanded scope of taxation under sec-
tion 691 was made in a 1952 Harvard Law Review Note:
[I]f Congress was expanding Section 42, it may be argued that the
vagueness of Section 126 was intended to give the Commissioner
and the courts discretion in deriving the content from considera-
tions of wise tax policy, and that an expansive approach such as that
evinced by Enright would produce more rational results. The phra-
seology of Section 126(a)(3) is capable of meaning that the succes-
sor shall stand in decedent's shoes and be treated as decedent would
have been had he lived, that the applicability of the section is not to
be determined by the nature of the "right" at decedent's death. 1 1
Other commentators concluded that more items could be taxed under
the new concept of income in respect of a decedent than under the
prior law's taxation of "accrued" income. 10 2
Two cases played important roles in determining the scope of in-
come in respect of a decedent. The first, O'Daniel's Estate v. Commis-
sioner,10 3 required the court to address the argument that IRD was
limited to amounts the decedent had a legally enforceable right to re-
ceive at death.104 The item in question was an employee bonus
awarded after the employee's death to which the decedent had not
had a legally enforceable right.105 The court held the right to receive
income in respect of a decedent is "not necessarily a legally enforcea-
ble right" and that the bonus was IRD because it was "derived
through rights he had acquired, which, even if not fixed at the time of
his death, were then expectancies which later bore fruit.' 0 6 The Sec-
ond Circuit's concept of "right" was inconsistent with common law
principles which required enforceability. 10 7 The court viewed "the
term as merely a convenient way of describing all income items com-
ing into a successor's hands because of decedent's death."' 0 8
The adoption of the rationale that the tax life of the decedent is to be extended to
include those items which he would have reported ultimately as income, had death not
intervened, is obviously a somewhat different proposition than the concept of "accrued
items" in the Enright decision. It does, however, conform with the spirit and the word-
ing of Section 126, and also with the Reports of the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Committee on Finance.
Id. at 276.
101. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1032.
102. See Drye, supra note 97, at 203; Freyburger, supra note 97, at 966; Polisher, supra note 97,
at 282; Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1026.
103. 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
104. Id. at 967-68.
105. Id. at 967.
106. Id. at 968.
107. Polisher, supra note 97, at 275.
108. See Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at
1027 (footnote omitted).
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The second case, Commissioner v. Linde,0 9 required the court to
address the argument that income in respect of a decedent was a relief
provision limited to taxing amounts that would have been "accrued"
income under prior law.110 In rejecting that position, the court held:
[W]hile Sec. 126 was designed to relieve this bunching [problem],
there is nothing in the legislative history or in the text of Sec. 126 to
indicate that it was intended to be anything other than an improved
device to accomplish the general purpose of the internal revenue
code that all income should pay a tax and that death should not rob
the United States of the revenue which otherwise it would have had.
We think it clear that the intent of Congress continued to be as
stated in the Enright case "to cover into income the assets of dece-
dents, earned during their life and unreported as income.""'
Linde, harshly criticized as "but a paraphrase of the [Harvard Law
Review] note in abridged form," 1 2 would be relied upon repeatedly
by courts as having established that section 691 expanded taxation of
earned, but untaxed, income transferred at death."13
D. Summary
Section 691's taxation of "gross income in respect of a decedent"
represented an expanded effort to tax all earned, but untaxed, income
of decedents. In 1934, Congress had attempted to solve the problem
of income that escaped taxation at death by requiring that decedents'
final returns include income "accrued" up to the time of death. The
"bunching" problem that initial effort created prompted Congress to
revisit the issue in 1942. Congress' solution was to repeal the prior
law and enact a new statutory scheme designed to tax "[a]ll amounts
of gross income which are not includible in the income of the dece-
dent.""11 4 "Accrual," an accounting concept, was discarded and the
more encompassing phrase "gross income in respect of a decedent"
was enacted so "that death should not rob the United States of the
revenue which otherwise it would have had.""115
109. 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954).
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Frank C. Scott, The Strange Case of Commissioner v. Linde, 33 TAXES 675, 677 (1955).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 264 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1959); Estate of Riegelman v.
Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1958); Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873,
879 (1976), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977); Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937,
941 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
114. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 84 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 436; S. REP. No. 77-
1631, at 101 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 580.
115. Linde, 213 F.2d at 5 (footnote omitted).
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III. JUDICIAL EFFORTS To IDENTIFY INCOME IN RESPECT OF
A DECEDENT
Judicial efforts to identify income in respect of a decedent have re-
sulted in development of several court-devised tests. Courts have al-
ternatively relied upon the statutory language, legislative history, and
Treasury Regulations as supporting, if not mandating, a particular
analysis. Application of all judicially developed tests is fact intensive.
The fact-based nature of the inquiry precludes adoption of a single
test appropriate to identify income in respect of a decedent in all the
settings in which it can arise.
A. The Income to Decedent If He Had Lived Test
The test to determine which post-death receipts constitute income
in respect of a decedent might be found through careful examination
of the statutory language. Section 691(a)(1) provides for taxation "of
all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not prop-
erly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date
of his death or a prior period. 11 6 Section 691(a)(3) provides that
IRD has the same "character which it would have had in the hands of
the decedent if the decedent had lived and received such amount. 1
1 7
Income in respect of a decedent, consequently, may simply be earned
income which was not taxable to the decedent because of his method
of accounting, but which would have been included in the decedent's
income at some point had he lived.
Support for an income to decedent if he had lived test can be found
in early decisions. The fact that amounts would have been income to
the decedent was sometimes stated in such a way as to suggest it was
dispositive." 8 At other times, although the case was decided under an
alternative test, the fact that the item would have been income to the
decedent was cited as an important factor.119 For example, in Com-
missioner v. Linde, the Ninth Circuit concluded:
116. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
117. Id. § 691(a)(3).
118. Latendresse v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 318, 324-26 (1956), affd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.
1957) ("Had the renewal commissions... been paid to Frank while he lived, they would unques-
tionably have been taxable to him.... Accordingly, we hold that those commissions are taxable
to her as ordinary income, in the year of receipt, under section 126(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code."); Estate of Remington v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 99, 104-05 (1947) ("If the payments of a
portion of the commissions on insurance had been made to decedent, they could have been
nothing but income .... Such a view of the case could be dispositive of it.").
119. See, e.g., O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966, 967 (2d Cir. 1949); Estate of
Bausch v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1433, 1438-39 (1950), affd, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate
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If the decedent had lived until the day when these crop pool pro-
ceeds were paid to him the payments so received would have been
ordinary income. Sec. 126 itself contains strong evidence of con-
gressional intent to see to it that the tax upon income which would
have been derived had the decedent lived should not be lost to the
treasury in consequence of his death.120
Linde, however, was decided under the economic activities test.121
In 1961, the I.R.S., perhaps encouraged by the language in the case
law, argued for use of the income to decedent if he had lived test in
Estate of Davison v. United States. 22 The I.R.S. contended "that in-
come in respect of a decedent is merely that money which would have
been reported as income by the decedent if she had but lived to collect
it herself.' 2 3 Such a test, however, was rejected as overly inclusive:
We do not agree with the defendant that all money received by the
estate is to be treated as it would have been if the decedent had
lived and received it. That comprehends too much, and does not
adequately distinguish between income earned by the decedent and
income earned entirely by the estate after decedent's death. 2 4
The court, nonetheless, held the fact that the amounts "would have
been income to the decedent had she but lived to receive them" was
an element in the concept of income in respect of a decedent. 2 5
B. The Economic Activities Test
The "gross income" to be taxed under section 691 must be "in re-
spect of a decedent." Since one must usually perform services or ar-
range for the use or disposition of property in order to receive gross
income, some activity on the part of the decedent that resulted in the
post-death payment is implied.12 6 Section 691(a)(3)'s reference to
"the transaction in which the right to receive the income was origi-
nally derived" suggests an act or series of acts performed by the dece-
dent or on the decedent's behalf which directly led to the payment. 12 7
A comparison of the decedent's activities with those of his successor
to determine whose activities were primarily responsible for the post-
of Narischkine v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1128, 1130-31 (1950), affd, 189 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1951)
(per curiam).
120. 213 F.2d at 4.
121. Id.
122. 292 F.2d 937, 940 (Ct. CI. 1961).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 942.
126. See FERGUSON ET AL, supra note 16, at 3:10 ("[T]he income must have been attributable
to the decedent's services, the decedent's sales, or the decedent's income-producing property.")
(footnote omitted).
127. See I.R.C. § 691(a)(3).
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death payment may be necessary to identify income in respect of a
decedent.
In 1949, the Second Circuit adopted an economic activities test in
O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner.128 O'Daniel died in 1943, while
employed by a company which had an employee bonus plan.129 Em-
ployees had no enforceable rights under the plan until shares were
designated. 130 The decedent's bonus was not designated until 1944.131
In holding the bonus constituted income in respect of a decedent, the
Second Circuit focused on the person whose economic activities re-
sulted in the post-death payment.132 The court concluded that the bo-
nus was compensation for the decedent's services and "any right to
receive it that was realized by his estate was acquired through him and
never arose in any other way or through any other source.' 33 The
fact that the decedent had no legal right to the bonus at the time of his
death did not matter. 34 The court concluded that the right referred to
in the statute as having been acquired from the decedent was "not
necessarily a legally enforceable right but merely any right derived
through his services rendered while living."'1 35
In the late 1950s, the Second Circuit had little difficulty in using the
economic activities test to identify income in respect of a decedent in
the personal service partnership context. In Estate of Riegelman v.
Commissioner,136 the decedent had been a partner in a law firm. 137
His estate was entitled to certain payments after his death under the
partnership agreement. 38 Although the case involved only an estate
tax issue, 139 the court in dictum concluded that the post-death pay-
ments were income in respect of a decedent.140 It used the economic
activities test, finding that the payments were "the fruits of the man's
professional activity" and "were [not] attributable to anything done by
Riegelman's estate.' 41 The very next year, the Second Circuit
squarely held that post-death partnership payments constituted in-
128. 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
129. Id. at 967.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 967-68.
133. Id. at 967.
134. Id. at 968.
135. Id.
136. 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958).
137. Id. at 316.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 319.
141. Id.
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come in respect of a decedent under the economic activities test in
United States v. Ellis.142
Second Circuit decisions established the economic activities test.143
They suggested that almost all post-death employee and partnership
payments would be income in respect of a decedent. 144 The relation-
ship between a decedent's activities and the post-death payment (as
well as the absence of activities by a decedent's successors) suggested
the economic activities test was sufficient to identify IRD in compen-
sation related cases. But could the economic activities test be used to
identify noncompensatory amounts as income in respect of a
decedent?
The Ninth Circuit held the economic activities test could in Com-
missioner v. Linde. 45 The decedent had been a member of several
cooperative marketing associations to which he had delivered grapes
during his life.146 The cooperatives were to process the grapes into
wine, sell the products, and distribute the net proceeds to their mem-
bers based on the quantity of grapes delivered.1 47 Wine made from
grapes delivered by the decedent had not been sold at the time of his
death.148 If the decedent had died possessing the grapes, his estate
would have been entitled to a new basis as the grapes would have
been property acquired from a decedent.149 If the grapes had been
processed into wine which had been sold during the decedent's life,
the post-death payments would have been IRD in the form of an ac-
count receivable possessed at death.150 The court had to decide
whether the proceeds were IRD where the grapes had been delivered
before death but the sales occurred after death.' 5'
142. 264 F.2d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 1959) ("This [partnership] contract did not result from any
bargain between the surviving partners and Ellis' estate but stemmed solely from Ellis' efforts
and bargaining position during his lifetime.").
143. See, e.g., Ellis, 264 F.2d at 327; Estate of Riegelman, 253 F.2d at 319; Bausch's Estate v.
Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1951); O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
966, 968 (2d Cir. 1949).
144. See Ellis, 264 F.2d at 327; Estate of Riegelman, 253 F.2d at 319; Bausch's Estate, 186 F.2d
at 314; O'Daniel's Estate, 173 F.2d at 968.
145. 213 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1954).
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 C.B. 366, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173; see
also Estate of Burnett v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 897, 903 (1943) (holding raised crops were not
"accrued" income under section 42 of pre-1943 law).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) ex. 5(i)(1957).
151. Linde, 213 F.2d at 2.
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The court used the economic activities test and decided the pay-
ments were income in respect of a decedent. 152 It compared the activ-
ities of the decedent with those of his estate:
We think that the text of section 126 as well as the history of the
legislation relating to the income of a decedent demonstrate the
soundness of the O'Daniel decision and that the principles there
expressed must be applied in the instant case .... The payments
which the taxpayer received in 1945 were realized under and in con-
sequence of contracts and deals made by the decedent in his life-
time. No act or thing taken or performed by the taxpayer operated
to procure or to give rise to this payment. Such payments had their
source exclusively in the decedent's contract and arrangement with
the cooperative associations. 153
The decedent's delivery had converted his interest from one in prop-
erty to a right to collect sale proceeds.154 Consequently, the fact that
the sale occurred after the decedent's death did not matter. 155 The
decedent had placed the property beyond his control under an ar-
rangement which would lead to his receipt of sale proceeds. 156 His
successors did not receive section 1014 property, but the right to col-
lect those sale proceeds after his death.157
By 1966, the economic activities test was widely, if not exclusively,
used to identify income in respect of a decedent.' 58 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the district court in Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross
used that test to determine whether proceeds of a stock sale com-
pleted after the decedent's death were IRD.159 The court concluded
that the proceeds were IRD because the decedent's economic activity
had produced the income and, at the time of his death, he "had only
to await the date of the closing to receive the sums due under the
contract of sale" he had negotiated. 160 It found the estate's activities
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 7; Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31,
at 1030 n.46.
155. Linde, 213 F.2d at 3.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Id. at 2.
158. See, e.g., Bernard v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Estate of
Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 941-42 (Ct. CI. 1961).
159. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 907-08 (N.D. Ga. 1966), affd on other
grounds, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) ("The cases have held consistently that the
criterion of taxability of income as income in respect of a decedent is whether the post-death
payments are in fact due to the services performed by or economic activities of the decedent.")
(citations omitted).
160. Id. at 909.
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in consummating the closing "merely perfunctory and of no material
significance.' 1 61
The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal but rejected the economic ac-
tivities test.162 The court noted:
Although it is pertinent to inquire whether the income received
after death was attributable to activities and economic efforts of the
decedent in his lifetime, these activities and efforts must give rise to
a right to that income. And the right is to be distinguished from the
activity which creates the right [to receive income]. Absent such a
right, no matter how great the activities or efforts, there would be
no taxable income under § 691.163
The economic activities test was held to be "open-ended and some-
what inadequate" considering the scope of section 691.164
Support for a rejection of the economic activities test was found in a
Treasury Regulation example. 165 TWo transactions were addressed.
In the first, the decedent, A, had sold and delivered apples to X but
had not received payment at the time of his death.166 In the second,
the decedent, A, had entered negotiations for the sale of apples to Y,
but no agreement had been reached, nor had any apples been deliv-
ered, at the time of his death.167 After death, the decedent's executor
received payment for the sale to X and completed the sale to Y.168
The regulation provided that only the proceeds received in the sale to
X were income in respect of a decedent. 169
The Fifth Circuit found the regulation inconsistent with use of the
economic activities test:
Note that the sale to Y was not complete. No contract had been
effected. Yet negotiations had commenced and been carried on by
A, the decedent, prior to his death. The sale went through after A's
death. The regulations state that this is not income in respect of a
decedent. However a contrary result could easily be reached under
the broad test used by the District Court since it could well be found
that the sale was a result of the negotiations by A, or a result of the
"services performed by or the economic activities of the decedent"
during his lifetime. What is lacking in the example, of course, is any
right on A's part to receive the income prior to his death.170
161. Id.
162. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
163. Id.
164. Id.







The court held post-death sales proceeds would be income in respect
of a decedent only if the decedent had a right to receive the proceeds
at the time of his death. 171
The right to income test soon displaced the economic activities test
in the identification of income in respect of a decedent. 72 Nonethe-
less, the level of a decedent's activities and that of his successor re-
mains an important, if no longer conclusive, factor in the identification
of IRD. Two cases illustrate the continuing importance of a dece-
dent's economic activities.
In Collins v. United States, the district court had to decide whether
post-death payments required by employment contracts negotiated by
a decedent were income in respect of a decedent. 73 Characterizing
the payments as IRD under the right to income test posed a problem
if the court had to conclude that the decedent possessed a right to
receive the amounts because the decedent could never have received
the amounts in question.' 74 The court questioned the applicability of
the right to income test in the employment context but, nonetheless,
found the necessary right:
It is submitted that where one is dealing with post-death payments
attributable to the personal services of a decedent and payable upon
his death, the right to receive the money has certainly matured and
the decedent's entitlement to the payments is simply not relevant.
If, however, decedent's entitlement is a sine qua non of income in
respect of a decedent, I submit that such entitlement could be found
under the facts of the case at bar. The decedent here bargained for
these payments in return for his personal services and for his re-
maining employed up to the date of his death. The consideration
for those payments flowed entirely from him.' 75
The court clearly would have preferred to use the economic activities
test but felt compelled to find an entitlement under the right to in-
come test.' 76
In Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, the Tax Court had to determine
whether post-death corporate liquidation distributions were IRD
where the liquidation was in process, but not completed, at the time of
171. Id. at 696.
172. See, e.g., Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1981); Halliday
v. United States, 655 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1981); Claiborne v. United States, 648 F.2d 448, 452
(6th Cir. 1981); Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Sidles v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 880 (1976), affid, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
173. 318 F. Supp. 382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aftfd, 448 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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the sole shareholder's death.177 The court's findings indicate that the
decedent's activities were the most important factor in its determina-
tion that the decedent had a right to income at the time of his
death.178 The court found, for instance, that "[t]he liquidating distri-
bution had its source exclusively in decedent's actions";1 79 the dece-
dent's "vote for liquidation created a right to receive" the
distribution; 80 "[t]he estate's right to such proceeds derived solely
from decedent's death and not from its own efforts";' 8' and
"[w]hatever actions the estate took were of no material signifi-
cance."'1 82 Actions of the corporation necessary to make the liquidat-
ing distribution, similarly, were dismissed as "mere formalities;
ministerial acts necessary to complete the liquidation under State
law."'1 83 Sidles suggests that the economic activities test survives be-
neath the surface of the right to income test; if the post-death payment
is clearly attributable to the decedent's activities, the transaction will
be found to have "sufficiently matured" as of the decedent's death so
as to have created the necessary "right" to receive the income when
subsequently realized. 184
C. The Right to Income Test
Several factors support the conclusion that the decedent must have
possessed a right to receive income at the time of his death for it to
constitute income in respect of a decedent. First, Congress used
"right" thirteen times in the three subsections of section 691(a). 8 5
Section 691(a)(1) provides for taxation of the person who acquired
the "right" to receive IRD from the decedent. 186 Section 691(a)(2)
provides rules for taxation of IRD upon certain transfers of the
"right" to receive it.187 And section 691(a)(3) provides that the
"right" shall be treated as if it had been acquired by a decedent's suc-
cessor in the transaction in which the "right" to receive the income
177. 65 T.C. 873 (1976), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).






184. Id.; see Claiborne v. United States, 648 F.2d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 1981) ("The basic thrust of
the Congressional purpose appears to us to be to include in income accounted for under § 691 all
income where economic activities had progressed to the point of either legal or equitable
entitlement.").
185. I.R.C. § 691(a).
186. Id. § 691(a)(1).
187. Id. § 691(a)(2).
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was originally derived. 188 Second, the legislative history can be read
to support a right to income requirement. 189 Finally, Treasury Regula-
tions provide that income in respect of a decedent refers to "amounts
to which decedent was entitled as gross income" at death.190
1. Recognition of the Right to Income Test
In O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner,'9' the estate contended that a
post-death bonus was not income in respect of a decedent because the
decedent had not possessed a legally enforceable right to the payment
at the time of death. 92 The Tax Court disagreed and held the bonus
was IRD. 193 The Second Circuit, on appeal, also rejected a legally
enforceable right requirement:
The bonus was derived through rights he had acquired, which even
if not fixed at the time of his death were then expectancies which
later bore fruit. It seems apparent from what we have already said
that "the right ... acquired by the decedent's estate from the dece-
dent" which is referred to in Section 126(a)(1)(A) is not necessarily
a legally enforceable right but merely any right derived through his
services rendered while living.' 94
The court found "[s]uch a right" as it had in mind had passed to the
decedent's estate with the result that the bonus was income in respect
of a decedent. 195
Although the Second Circuit purported to find a "right" in
O'Daniel's, it actually held an "expectancy" that arose in the employ-
ment context was income in respect of a decedent under the economic
activities test.196 Shortly after the decision, a commentator correctly
concluded that the court's "liberal interpretation of 'right' views the
term as merely a convenient way of describing all income items com-
ing into a successor's hands because of decedent's death" 197 and, fur-
thermore, "[i]f it is correct, there evidently can be no limitation
inferred from the phrase [right to receive the amount] under discus-
sion. '"19 The Second Circuit's opinion nine years later in Estate of
188. Id. § 691(a)(3).
189. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 185 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 437; S. REP. No. 77-
1631, at 101-02 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 581.
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1965).
191. 10 T.C. 631 (1948), affd, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
192. Id. at 632.
193. Id.
194. O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966, 968 (2d Cir. 1949).
195. Id.
196. See Polisher, supra note 97, at 275.
197. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at 1027.
198. Id.
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Riegelman v. Commissioner, a case decided under the economic activi-
ties test, supports such a conclusion.199
In 1967, however, the Fifth Circuit rejected the economic activities
test and adopted the right to income test in Trust Co. of Georgia v.
Ross.2°° Before the court justified use of a right to income test, how-
ever, it sought to reconcile decisions under the economic activities test
with the test it would adopt.20 1 While noting that courts had em-
ployed the economic activities test in earlier cases, the court observed
that "the ratio decidendi" in those cases depended on the subsisting
facts.202 The court suggested close examination of the facts in several
of those cases indicated the courts were dealing with payments made
"pursuant to rights created by the decedent during his lifetime" or
"pursuant to ... contract[s]" entered into by the decedent.20 3 Those
earlier decisions, consequently, although decided under the wrong
test, would have been decided the same way under the right to
income test.
The court, finding "[t]he tortuous language of the statute... of little
help in divining the proper test, '204 relied upon the general definition
of IRD in the regulations to support adoption of the right to income
test.20 5 The regulations provide that income in respect of a decedent
refers to "amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross income
but which were not properly includible" in the decedent's gross in-
come prior to his death.206 An example in the regulations was also
cited in support of a right to income requirement.20 7 Although Trust
Co. of Georgia represented an important turning point in the identifi-
cation of income in respect of a decedent, it provided few answers as
to what the right to income test required.
199. 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958). The court stated:
In O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, we held payments made to the estate of the
decedent taxable as "income in respect of a decedent" even though the decedent had
no enforceable right to the payments during his lifetime. Although the opinion inti-
mated that the right to the payment might have been accrued under the rationale of
Helvering v. Enright's Estate, our decision in Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, was a
square holding that "accrual" of a payment during decedent's lifetime was not
necessary.
Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted).




204. Id. at 696.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 696 n.3.
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The Sixth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's right to income test in
its 1969 decision in Keck v. Commissioner.2 °8 The issue in Keck was
whether post-death corporate liquidation distributions were income in
respect of a decedent.20 9 In rejecting the economic activities test, the
court held that absent a right to income, no matter how great the de-
cedent's activities, there is no income under section 691.210 Because
the liquidation in Keck was subject to a number of material contingen-
cies at the date of the decedent's death, the court held the decedent
did not possess a right to the proceeds and the amounts were not in-
come in respect of a decedent. 21'
The 1976 Tax Court case of Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner212 un-
derscores the difficulty courts have had in employing the right to in-
come test. Sidles, the sole shareholder of a corporation, approved a
plan of complete liquidation four months before his death.2 13 The liq-
uidation, incomplete when Sidles died, was completed by his estate
five months after his death.21 4 Both parties relied on the right to in-
come test to support their contrary positions. 215 The taxpayer's posi-
tion was that no right to liquidation proceeds existed until the
corporation's board of directors authorized the distribution after the
decedent's death.2 16
The Tax Court, citing Trust Co. of Georgia, held that section 691
requires that the decedent must have possessed a right to the income
at the time of his death.217 Whether the decedent possessed the requi-
site right was a question of fact to be determined by consideration of
relevant factors.2 18 One of those factors was whether the income re-
sulted from the decedent's economic activities and efforts. 219 The
court concluded that the right to income test required the court to
determine "whether the transaction had sufficiently matured as of de-
cedent's death so as to create in him a right to receive the income
when it was subsequently realized. '220
208. 415 F.2d 531, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1969).
209. Id. at 533.
210. Id. at 535.
211. Id. at 534-35.
212. 65 T.C. 873 (1976), afffd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
213. Id. at 875.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 877.
216. Id. at 878.
217. Id. at 880.
218. Id. at 880 & n.5.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 880.
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The court concluded the decedent had an absolute and uncondi-
tional right to the liquidating distribution at the time of his death on
the basis of the decedent's economic activities. 221 The court found
that the decedent's actions were the source of the distribution, his
vote for liquidation had created the right to receive the distribution,
and the estate's right to the proceeds resulted solely from the dece-
dent's death and not from the estate's own efforts.222 The fact that
Sidles, as sole shareholder, could have rescinded the transaction was
unimportant since he had not done so.223 The decedent's activities
and the lack of any material contingencies, as had existed in Keck, led
the court to conclude that the transaction had sufficiently matured as
of the decedent's death to have created a right to the distribution. 224
Separate opinions in Sidles illustrate the disagreement over what
the right to income test requires. Two judges concurred in the result
but concluded, at least in the sale proceeds context, that the decedent
must have possessed a legal right to income at death for the proceeds
to be income in respect of a decedent. 225 TWo judges concurred in the
conclusion that the amounts were IRD in large part because of the
control the decedent possessed over the liquidation as sole share-
holder.226 Three judges dissented on the ground that no right to in-
come existed because the liquidation had not proceeded to a point
beyond the control of the sole shareholder-the decedent or his estate
could have rescinded the liquidation resolution.2 27
Claiborne v. United States228 required the Sixth Circuit to consider
the nature of the right to income required under section 691. The
decedent had granted an option to purchase her farm property in
1967.229 The contract provided that if the option was exercised, it
would become a binding agreement. 230 The buyer exercised the op-
tion during the decedent's life and, with her agent's permission, Ford
Motor Company entered into possession of the property. 231 The
221. Id. at 881 & n.6.
222. Id. at 881.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 882.
225. Id. at 888 (Hall, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 889-90 (Tannewald, J., dissenting in part).
227. Id. at 896 (Featherston, J., dissenting).
228. 648 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 449.




owner died before the closing, which occurred sixteen days after her
death.232
The district court had held that the post-death proceeds were not
income in respect of a decedent because the decedent had not had the
necessary right to income at the time of her death.2 33 Its decision
rested upon its findings that the buyer could not have been compelled
to purchase the property and that the decedent's remedy was limited
to the option consideration already paid as liquidated damages.
234
The buyer's entry into possession was dismissed because it was under
authority granted by the seller's agent.235
The district court's decision was rejected on appeal.2 36 The Sixth
Circuit assumed that section 691 required the decedent to have had an
"enforceable" right to income at death237 and rejected the economic
activities test "which would exclude any consideration of enforceabil-
ity as an aspect of entitlement. '"238 The court acknowledged that, as a
strict matter of law, the decedent did not have a right to the purchase
price at death.2 39 However, the court concluded the decedent was en-
titled to specific performance of the contract under local law because
of Ford's entry upon the land and exercise of the option.2 40 Finding
"[t]he basic thrust of the Congressional purpose.., to be to include in
income accounted for under § 691 all income where economic activi-
ties had progressed to the point of either legal or equitable entitle-
ment," the court held the proceeds were income in respect of a
decedent.241
2. Alternative Formulations
a. Substantial Certainty of Receipt Test
Halliday v. United States242 required the Fifth Circuit to revisit its
decision in Trust Co. of Georgia and consider the requirements of the
right to income test. The issue in Halliday was whether certain insur-
ance renewal commissions were income in respect of a decedent.243
232. Id.
233. Id. at 6.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Claiborne v. United States, 648 F.2d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 1981).
237. Id. at 451.
238. Id. at 452; see Gilbert P. Verbit, Income in Respect of a Decedent, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
419, 437 (1982) (discussing the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Claiborne).
239. Claiborne, 648 F.2d at 451.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 452.
242. 655 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1981).
243. ld. at 69.
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The district court had held the commissions were not IRD because the
decedent did not have a legal right to receive the commissions.244 It
had concluded that the concept of income in respect of a decedent
included only sums to which the decedent was legally entitled at the
time of his death.245
The Fifth Circuit reversed because the district court had applied an
incorrect standard for determining income in respect of a decedent. 246
The court held that the code, the regulations, and its earlier decision
in Trust Co. of Georgia did not require the decedent have a legally
enforceable right to income in order for a post-death payment to con-
stitute income in respect of a decedent. 247 Such a requirement, the
court concluded, would permit taxpayers to avoid application of sec-
tion 691 by failing to include payment obligations in binding
contracts.248
The Fifth Circuit not only rejected a legally enforceable right to in-
come test in Halliday but articulated a formulation of the right to in-
come test that required examination of the probability of payment as
of the decedent's date of death.249 It held "that for purposes of Sec-
tion 691, a right to income arises where the evidence shows a substan-
tial certainty that benefits directly related to the decedent's past
economic activities will be paid to his heirs or estate upon his death,
notwithstanding the absence of a legally enforceable obligation. '250
That determination is a question of fact for the trial court.251 The re-
newal commissions in Halliday were held to be income in respect of a
decedent because the court concluded the decedent had a sufficiently
certain right, albeit not necessarily a legally enforceable one, to re-
ceive the commissions.252
A few years later, the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit employed the
substantial certainty of receipt test in Rollert Residuary Trust v. Com-
missioner.253 An issue in Rollert was whether a bonus awarded after
an employee's death was income in respect of a decedent.254 Rollert,
an employee of General Motors Corporation, died November 27,
244. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R. 2d 80-5999, 80-6002 (N.D.
Ala. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Halliday v. United States, 655 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1981).
245. Id.
246. Halliday, 655 F.2d at 69.
247. Id. at 71.
248. Id.




253. 80 T.C. 619 (1983), affd, 752 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1985).
254. Id. at 628.
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1969.255 Although no rules dealt with awarding of bonuses to de-
ceased employees, the corporate practice had been to award bonuses
to employees who had at least two months of service in the year of
death and met other requirements. 256 Annual bonuses were contem-
plated, but a committee had the right to modify or suspend the
plan.257 A substantial bonus was awarded after the decedent's death
on March 2, 1970, with respect to the decedent's 1969 employment. 258
The Tax Court acknowledged the uncertain boundaries of the right
to income test in Rollert.259 It found the appellate opinions in Trust
Co. of Georgia, Keck, and Claiborne had "left considerable room for
disagreement over exactly what constitutes a right or entitlement to
income. ' 260 Trust Co. of Georgia was read as having held that a right
to income exists even if a few ministerial aspects of the transaction
have not been completed at death.261 Keck was read as having held
that material contingencies will negate the existence of the required
right.2 62 Claiborne, although holding that a legal or equitable right to
income at death would suffice, was not read as having held that "a
right enforceable at law or in equity is an absolute prerequisite to
finding a pre-death entitlement to income. '263
The Tax Court determined, however, that the right to income test
had been clarified by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Halliday and its
own decision in Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner.264 The Tax Court
found Halliday's substantial certainty of receipt test consistent with
the four-factor test it had articulated in Peterson.265 Employing the
right to income test in light of these decisions, the court concluded
that Rollert had a substantial certainty of receiving a bonus at the
time of his death.266 Rollert's substantial certainty of receipt meant
the right to income required by section 691 existed and that the bonus
was income in respect of a decedent. 267
255. Id. at 621.
256. Id. at 624.
257. Id. at 622.
258. Id.





264. Id. at 631-32 (citing Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 630 (1980), affd, 667
F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981)).
265. Id. at 632.
266. Id. at 635.
267. Id.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed its decisions in Keck and Clai-
borne and the test to be employed under section 691 to identify in-
come in respect of a decedent. 268 The court rejected a legally
enforceable right requirement and held that "[t]he key test for deter-
mining whether the decedent had a 'right' or was 'entitled' to the post-
mortem bonus should be based on the likelihood, at the time of his
death, that he would receive the bonus, not on his legal rights to it. ''269
Because there was a substantial certainty at the time of Rollert's death
that he would receive a bonus, he had the necessary right to income
and the bonus was income in respect of a decedent. 270
b. Four-Factor Test
In Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner,271 the court had to determine
whether post-death sale proceeds from raised calves were income in
respect of a decedent. 272 Peterson entered a contract on July 11, 1972,
for the sale of approximately 3,300 calves.273 The contract permitted
Peterson to designate the delivery dates so long as delivery was before
November 1, 1972, with respect to certain calves, and December 15,
1972, with respect to others.274 The risk of loss was with Peterson un-
til delivery.275 Peterson died November 9, 1972, without having deliv-
ered any calves or having designated a delivery date.276 His estate
raised and fed the cattle and made delivery in December of 1972.277
The Tax Court engaged in a comprehensive review of income in
respect of a decedent case law in Peterson and distilled four require-
ments to be used to determine whether a decedent possessed a right
to sales proceeds at the time of his death.278 The four factors were:
(1) whether the decedent entered into a legally significant arrange-
ment regarding the subject matter of the sale, (2) whether the dece-
dent performed the substantive (nonministerial) acts required as
preconditions to the sale, (3) whether there existed at'the time of
the decedent's death any economically material contingencies which
might have disrupted the sale, and (4) whether the decedent would
have eventually received the sale proceeds if he or she had lived. 279
268. Rollert Residuary Trust v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1128, 1131-32 (6th Cir. 1985).
269. Id. at 1132.
270. Id.
271. 74 T.C. 630 (1980), affid, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
272. Id. at 630.
273. Id. at 631-32.
274. Id. at 632.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 634.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 639.
279. Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 677-78 (8th Cir. 1981).
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The court cautioned, however, that its list was not "meant to be an
ironclad formulation" of IRD because "[tihe innumerable types of
sales transactions and the different stages at which the seller's death
may intervene make any formulation of a list of criteria susceptible to
change."280
Utilizing the four-factor test, the Tax Court held that the sale pro-
ceeds were not income in respect of a decedent because the second
requirement had not been met-the decedent had not performed the
substantive acts required under the contract.281 While two-thirds of
the calves were deliverable at the time of the decedent's death, the
remaining one-third were too young for delivery.282 The estate's ac-
tivities in raising and feeding the calves so that they would satisfy the
terms of the contract were not merely "perfunctory or ministerial" but
were "substantial and essential acts. '283
In its appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the I.R.S. did not challenge the
four-factor test but contended that the portion of proceeds attributa-
ble to the calves that had been deliverable at death were income in
respect of a decedent. 284 The court rejected that position and con-
cluded that the Service's "apportionment or allocation argument in-
correctly emphasizes the condition or character of the subject matter
of the sale instead of the status of the transaction itself at the time of
the decedent's death. '285 Focusing on the status of the transaction at
the decedent's death, the Eighth Circuit held the proceeds were not
IRD because the estate's acts in performing the contract could not be
characterized as ministerial or minor.286 Although the Tax Court had
focused on the raising and feeding of the calves, 287 the Eighth Circuit
found the nonministerial acts included not only their care and feeding
but also delivery to the buyer.288
Eleven years later, the Tax Court decided Estate of Napolitano v.
Commissioner289 by considering two of the factors in the court's four-
factor test.290 Napolitano had entered into a contract to sell property
shortly before his death.291 The contract required the property be
280. Estate of Peterson, 74 T.C. at 639 n.9.
281. Id. at 644.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Estate of Peterson, 667 F.2d at 678.
285. Id. at 679.
286. Id. at 681.
287. Estate of Peterson, 74 T.C. at 644.
288. Estate of Peterson, 667 F.2d at 681.
289. 61 T.C.M. (RIA) 1633 (1992).
290. Id. at 1635 & n.7.
291. Id. at 1633.
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conveyed free of any violations of local law.2 92 At the time of Napoli-
tano's death, three violations existed that had not been resolved.293
Post-death negotiations resulted in a price reduction and the transfer
of the property subject to the violations.2 94 The Tax Court held the
sale proceeds were not income in respect of a decedent.295 While Na-
politano had entered into a legally significant relationship by execut-
ing the sales contract, he had not performed the substantive
(nonministerial) acts required as preconditions to the sale.2 96 The
property was not in a deliverable state on the date of death.297 The
sale of the property, consequently, had not ripened to the point where
the decedent had a right to the sale proceeds at the time of his
death.298
D. Summary
Congress enacted the income in respect of a decedent rules in 1942.
Since that time, courts have struggled to articulate tests to be used and
factors to be considered in identifying IRD. None of the tests an-
nounced to date is entirely satisfactory.
The income to the decedent if he had lived test is too inclusive to
serve as a test to identify income in respect of a decedent. Under such
a test, all proceeds from the post-death sale of appreciated property
would be income in respect of a decedent because they would have
been income to the decedent had he lived and received them. When
Congress enacted section 691, however, it did not repeal the stepped-
up basis rule under section 1014 for property acquired from a dece-
dent. Consequently, the critical task for any IRD test is to distinguish
between "earned" income and property. The income to the decedent
if he had lived test fails to do so.
Nonetheless, determining if the item would have been income to
the decedent if he had lived can serve as a threshold determination in
all IRD cases.299 Unless the amount would have been income to the
decedent under his method of accounting had he lived, the amount is
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1634.
294. Id.




299. See FERGUSON ET AL, supra note 16, at 3:10 (listing the fact that "the item of income
must have been taxable to the decedent had the decedent survived to the time income realiza-
tion occurred" as the first of four salient characteristics of income in respect of a decedent).
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not income in respect of a decedent after his death.300 In the case of
amounts which the decedent could not have received, such as amounts
payable to survivors pursuant to an employment contract, this deter-
mination must be made under the assumption that the decedent could
have received the amounts in question. If the question is answered
affirmatively, the inquiry must proceed to consideration of other fac-
tors or tests to determine if the amount is income in respect of a
decedent.
The economic activities test is sufficient to characterize correctly
certain post-death payments as income in respect of a decedent.
Amounts paid by a decedent's employer pursuant to a contract nego-
tiated by the decedent and ordinary income amounts that accrue with
the passage of time attributable to the decedent's ownership of prop-
erty (i.e., interest and rent) can be properly identified under such a
test. Such amounts are entirely attributable to the decedent's activi-
ties (the rendering of services or ownership of property) and should
not escape taxation at death.
The economic activities test, however, is ill-suited to characterize
correctly all post-death receipts. It provides insufficient guidance in
the case of post-death payments that are attributable not only to a
decedent's activities, but also to activities of his successors. For exam-
ple, income from the disposition of property is not always correctly
classified under the economic activities test. A mere comparison of a
decedent's activities with those of his successors could result in taxa-
tion of items that should not be taxed as income in respect of a
decedent.30
The right to income test is presently employed to identify income in
respect of a decedent. Courts have not always agreed, however, as to
what constitutes a right to income under section 691. Must the dece-
dent have had a right, enforceable at law or equity, to income at the
time of death? Such a requirement could permit substantial amounts
(i.e., post-death bonuses) that should be taxed as IRD to escape taxa-
300. See Miville v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 856, 862 (1970) (holding that payments
under a property settlement agreement were not income in respect of a decedent because "such
payments would not have been taxable to the [decedent] had she lived to receive them").
301. Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 630, 645 (1980), affd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir.
1981). The court recognized the limitations of the economic activities test:
We do not doubt that the decedent's efforts contributed far more to the completion of
the contract than those of the estate, but a weighing of the relative efforts is not the test
envisioned by section 691. Under respondent's [economic activities] formulation, any
work-in-progress which was the subject of a predeath contract of sale could constitute
income in respect of a decedent if the major part of the work had been completed prior
to the decedent's death. The statute, however, does not reach so broadly.
Id. (citation omitted).
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tion at death. Should courts engage in a probability analysis to deter-
mine whether there was a substantial certainty that a decedent would
have received an amount had he lived? Since such an inquiry would
arise only in cases where a post-death payment was received, would
the determination of probabilities be influenced by the post-death
facts? Should courts use the Tax Court's four-factor test? While such
a test may be adequate to classify sales proceeds, it is less helpful in
characterizing employment-related amounts. In the final analysis, is a
court's determination that a decedent possessed a right to income any-
thing more than shorthand for the court's conclusion that the item
under consideration should be taxed as income in respect of a
decedent? 30 2
IV. THE CASE FOR USING ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME PRECEDENTS
To IDENTIFY INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT
When Congress amended section 42 in 1934 to tax "accrued" in-
come in decedents' final returns, there is no indication that it had as-
signment of income cases in mind. In fact, few assignment of income
cases had been decided by the Supreme Court at that time.30 3 Con-
gress, moreover, was not concerned with preventing income from be-
ing shifted to lower-bracket taxpayers but with taxing income that was
entirely escaping taxation at death.
The congressional solution to that problem, nonetheless, was consis-
tent with what the Supreme Court would call "the first principle of
income taxation: that income must be taxed to him who earns it."'304
Section 42 required that "accrued" income be taxed to its earner in
the last return that would be filed for that person.305 However, by
taxing "accrued" income at the time of its transfer, Congress em-
ployed a different timing rule in section 42 than would be adopted in
donative assignment of income cases. Generally, assignment of in-
come does not accelerate taxation and the assignor is taxed only when
his assignee receives the income.306 Deferral of taxation for income
302. See Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, supra note 31, at
1027.
303. See Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
304. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
305. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 680, 694 (1934).
306. Friedman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 428, 436 (1963), affd, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965).
The court stated:
A cash basis taxpayer is not taxable on income until he receives it actually or construc-
tively. The making of a gift of his right to receive income does not cause such income
to be received until the donor derives the economic benefit of having the income re-
ceived by his donee.
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assigned at death, however, was simply not an option if the earner was
to be taxed.3 07
When Congress reconsidered section 42 in 1942, the assignment of
income doctrine was well-established as a result of landmark Supreme
Court decisions in the twelve years immediately preceding enact-
ment.30 8 Congress, no doubt aware of those cases,30 9 acted to provide
relief from the "bunching" problem under section 42 in a manner that
would not permit income to escape taxation at death. It shifted taxa-
tion of a decedent's earned, but untaxed, income to the decedent's
successors under the concept of gross income in respect of a decedent.
The harsh results produced by section 42-the bunching of income
into the decedent's final return and taxation of amounts that might
never be received-were thereby eliminated.
Congress suspended the general principle that income cannot be ef-
fectively assigned for income tax purposes in section 691. In fact, in
order to solve the problems under prior law, it mandated that the de-
cedent's successors become the owners of the decedent's earned, but
untaxed, income assigned at death. 310 Shifting taxation to the dece-
dent's successors meant the income could be taxed when eceived
by the assignee, consistent with the usual assignment of income
timing rule.
Others have recognized that income in respect of a decedent and
assignment of income are related.311 The leading commentators,
while noting that "[t]he problem of distinguishing rights to income
Id.; Rev. Rul. 72-312, 1972-1 C.B. 22, 22; Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-1 C.B. 32, 33 ("It has been
consistently held that a gift of income does not operate to accelerate the year of taxability.");
Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960-2 C.B. 203, 205; see Lyon & Eustice, supra note 26, at 354-56.
307. See I.R.C. §§ 441(b)(3), 443(a)(2).
308. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930).
309. See Apkin v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 692, 696 (1986) ("[A]ny possible application of the
[assignment of income] principles of Horst in the case of income in respect of a decedent was
specifically taken into account by Congress in 1942 when it enacted the predecessor to section
691.").
310. See I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
311. See, e.g., Donald H. Gordon, "Income in Respect of a Decedent" and Sales Transactions,
1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 30, 36; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 26, at 300, 385; Walter H. Nunnallee, The
Assignment of Income Doctrine as Applied to Section 1041 Divorce Transfers: How the Service
Got It Wrong, 68 OR. L. REV. 615, 644 (1989) ("Congress viewed the transfer of income items at
a taxpayer's death (known as 'income in respect of a decedent') as a de facto assignment of
income from the decedent to his estate or beneficiaries."); Note, Sales Transactions and Income
in Respect of a Decedent, 3 GA. L. REV. 606, 613-15 (1969).
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from property prompts reference to the assignment of income
cases," 312 contend:
Two basic issues lie at the heart of most assignment of income con-
troversies. Either the taxpayer seeks to pass income and the result-
ing income tax liability to a transferee, frequently by gratuitous
assignment, or the taxpayer attempts to convert future ordinary in-
come into present capital gain, frequently by a taxable disposi-
tion.... [However], neither of the traditional assignment of income
issues is normally present in the § 691 controversies. First, the stat-
ute specifically provides for assumption of tax liability by the trans-
feree of the right to income, and the transferor is no longer around
to be taxed. Secondly, the passing of the interest from the decedent
to others at death is not a taxable disposition and cannot give rise to
the classic capital gains versus ordinary income dispute. Further-
more, while assignment of income cases often deal with future earn-
ings, § 691 concerns only income the decedent has already
substantially earned before passing rights to that income to others
at death.313
They conclude, consequently, that assignment of income cases have
little applicability in identifying income in respect of a decedent.314
If applicability depends on the existence of one of the two basic
issues identified, assignment of income cases are clearly not relevant
in the identification of income in respect of a decedent. The first,
identification of the proper person to be taxed, is never an issue be-
cause Congress mandated that the decedents' successors were the
proper taxpayers in section 691. The second, the attempt to convert
ordinary income into capital gains, is never an issue under section 691
because income in respect of a decedent retains its original character.
However, what the commentators characterize as assignment of in-
come issues are merely two of the contexts in which the assignment of
income doctrine developed. 31 5 The fact that assignment of income
and income in respect of a decedent cases arise in different contexts,
however, is immaterial to the question of whether the cases are re-
lated and should be decided by reference to each other.
312. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:4.
313. Id. at 3:4-3:5 (footnotes omitted).
314. Id. at 3:4.
315. See Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and Assignment
of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 84 (1988). The author noted:
Over many decades, the courts have developed a two-branch doctrine generally re-
ferred to as assignment of income. The first branch, called donative assignment of in-
come, establishes which of several possible taxpayers should pay tax on an item of
income. The second branch, capital gains assignment of income, holds that certain as-
sets do not qualify for the capital gains preference.
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Donative assignment of income cases are relevant in income in re-
spect of a decedent cases because both involve a common inquiry. In
donative assignment of income cases, there is never a question as to
whether an item is income; the issue is who is the proper taxpayer to
be taxed on the income. That question is answered by examining the
character or status of the item at the time it was assigned to determine
if it was "earned" income or property.316 In income in respect of a
decedent cases, on the other hand, there is never a question as to who
the proper taxpayer is that should be taxed (the statute provides the
answer); the issue is whether the post-death receipt constitutes IRD.
That question is answered by examining the character or status of the
item at the time it was assigned 317 to determine if it was "earned"
income or property.318 The common inquiry in both settings is the
question the leading commentators identify under section 691-
whether the item transferred was income the transferor had "substan-
tially earned. '319
The relationship between assignment of income and income in re-
spect of a decedent is further evidenced by the fact that income in
respect of a decedent fills a gap in the assignment of income doctrine.
The general rule is that assignment of income does not accelerate tax-
ation and the assignor is taxed when the income is received by the
assignee. Who is to be taxed, however, if income is assigned during
life, but payment is not received until after the assignor's death?
The assignor cannot be taxed at the time of receipt because his final
tax year closed at death. If section 691 had not been enacted, whether
the assignee would be taxed on the income would depend on whether
the item was included in the decedent's gross estate for estate tax pur-
poses. Items included in the gross estate would receive a new basis
316. Friedman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 428, 435 (1963), affd, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965).
The court stated:
The theory of the cases dealing with anticipatory assignment of income by gift has not
been concerned with when the income was accrued in a legal sense of accrual but rather
with whether the income had been earned so that the right to the payment at a future
date existed when the gift was made.
Id. (citation omitted).
317. Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1981); Estate of Sidles v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 880 (1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
318. See Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 630, 646 (1980), affd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th
Cir. 1981). The court noted:
Although the legislative history of section 691 indicates that it is not necessary for an
item to have been earned by the decedent in any tax reporting sense or in any technical
accounting sense, we believe the use of the term "earned" is appropriate insofar as it
connotes the practical completion of a transaction.
Id.
319. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:5.
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under section 1014 and the income would escape taxation forever.
Items not included in the decedent's gross estate would have a carry-
over basis under section 1015 in the assignee's hands and the assignee
would be taxed under section 61 when payment was received. Such
disparate results, however, would be inconsistent with the assignment
of income doctrine and the congressional objectives in enacting sec-
tion 691. Section 691 fills this gap in the assignment of income doc-
trine and preserves the item for income taxation under its special
rules.320
Utilization of assignment of income cases to identify income in re-
spect of a decedent is justified on policy grounds. Congress enacted
section 691 "to accomplish the general purpose of the internal reve-
nue code that all income should pay a tax" 32' and to "reduce[ ] the
importance of death" in income taxation. 322 If an item could not have
been transferred during life without triggering the assignment of in-
come doctrine, its transfer at death should not permit it to escape tax-
ation. Conversely, if an item could have been transferred before
death without implicating assignment principles, taxation of the item
after death is unwarranted. The fact that death is rarely voluntary or
tax-motivated, moreover, should not permit "earned" income, which
would have triggered assignment of income principles had it been
transferred during life, to escape taxation at death.323
When income in respect of a decedent is considered in the context
of donative assignment of income cases, lack of a statutory definition
of the term makes sense. The determination of whether a particular
item is "earned" income at the time of its transfer, in the assignment
of income or income in respect of a decedent context, is a factual de-
termination to be made on a case-by-case basis.32 4 Congress, except
in a few areas, has not attempted to codify the factual circumstances
that trigger the assignment of income doctrine; rather, Congress has
deferred to the courts. By using the undefined term "gross income in
320. Estate of Carr v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1173, 1179-80 (1962); see FERGUSON ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 3:21 ("[I]f prior to death the decedent gratuitously assigns a right to income, the
donee who receives the income after the decedent's death must treat it as income in respect of a
decedent under § 691(a)(1)(B). This is true even though the assignment has been ineffective to
relieve the transferor of income tax liability during life.").
321. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1954).
322. Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
323. See Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1838 (1994) ("That death normally is considered to be involuntary is irrele-
vant. There is no general tax principle that involuntariness yields an exemption or other tax
benefit beyond those that Congress chooses to confer.").
324. See, e.g., Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Estate
of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 638 (1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
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respect of a decedent," Congress implicitly relied upon the courts to
give meaning to the phrase on a case-by-case basis in a manner consis-
tent with fundamental principles of federal income taxation.
V. RESULTS IN SELECTED CASES COMPARED
Assignment of income and income in respect of a decedent issues
can arise in a multitude of settings and involve almost any item of
gross income under section 61.325 Since the inquiry in both settings is
essentially the same, two separate, but substantially consistent, lines of
case law should exist. Courts in both lines of cases, moreover, should
have utilized similar criteria in determining whether an item was
"earned" income or property at the time of its transfer, regardless of
whether the question arose as a result of a lifetime or death transfer.
The following discussion compares results in selected cases under both
bodies of law.
Although the assignment of income doctrine and the income in re-
spect of a decedent concept apply equally to accrual and cash method
taxpayers, cases involving accrual taxpayers are rare. Two factors ac-
count for the lack of cases involving such taxpayers. First, relatively
few individuals use the accrual method of accounting. Second, the "all
events test" requires accrual taxpayers to report amounts they have a
fixed right to receive, the amount of which can be determined with
reasonable accuracy. Many items that could trigger assignment of in-
come problems or constitute income in respect of a decedent for cash
method decedents would have been properly includible in accrual tax-
payers' returns before the transfer. In the discussion that follows, con-
sequently, it is assumed that the assignors and decedents were cash




In its landmark decision in Helvering v. Horst,326 the Supreme
Court held that taxpayers cannot retain ownership of property (the
tree) and make an effective anticipatory assignment of its income (the
fruit) for federal income tax purposes.327 Horst detached negotiable
325. See Linde, 213 F.2d at 7 ("The language of section 126(a)(3) ... discloses that it cannot
be confined to any particular type or kind of income.... [l]ncome from all sources was contem-
plated, including capital gains, business income, interest, dividends, and the like.").
326. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
327. Id. at 120.
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interest coupons from bonds he owned and gave them to his son
before their due dates but retained ownership of the bonds. 328 The
Court found "[t]he dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxa-
tion of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to re-
ceive it and enjoy the benefits of it when paid. '329 It distinguished
gifts of income-producing property from gifts of income from prop-
erty. Horst, who had retained ownership of the property, fell in the
second category and remained taxable upon the property's income.330
The Court concluded that Horst was to be taxed "as if he had col-
lected the income and paid it over to the object of his bounty."331
Seven years after Horst, the Sixth Circuit in Austin v. Commis-
sioner332 held Horst applied to accrued interest gratuitously trans-
ferred with a debt instrument. 333 Austin assigned all of her right, title,
and interest in a promissory note to her children in 1940.334 At the
time of the gift, accrued interest on the note totalled $43,320.04. 335
The Sixth Circuit found the tree (the promissory note) had ripened
(accrued) fruit (interest) attached at the time of the transfer.336 The
donor was taxable on the accrued interest in the year paid to her as-
signees because she enjoyed the income's benefit through the exercise
of her power to command the income.337
The I.R.S. updated its position regarding the transfer of debt instru-
ments with accrued interest in Revenue Ruling 72-312.338 A taxpayer
transferred corporate bonds to a non-grantor trust. Interest had ac-
crued prior to the transfer. After reviewing assignment of income
principles, the Service ruled that the interest that had accrued on the
bonds prior to their transfer was includible in the donor's gross in-
come for his taxable year during which the interest was actually or
constructively received by the trust.339
328. Id. at 112.
329. Id. at 119.
330. Id. at 118-19.
331. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1941).
332. 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947).
333. Id. at 667.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 668.
337. Id. at 669.
338. Rev. Rul. 72-312, 1972-1 C.B. 22.
339. Id.
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Income in Respect of a Decedent
In 1961, the Sixth Circuit upheld taxation of accrued interest as in-
come in respect of a decedent in Richardson v. United States. 340 The
taxpayers argued that accrued interest transferred at death was not
income but principal of the decedent's estate that could not be consti-
tutionally taxed.341 The court rejected that argument on the grounds
that accrued interest was gain derived from capital and constituted
income that Congress could constitutionally tax under section 691.342
The I.R.S has issued a number of rulings indicating that accrued
interest is income in respect of a decedent. In Revenue Ruling 64-
104,343 the I.R.S. ruled that accrued interest on Series H United States
savings bonds that had not been received by cash method taxpayers is
income in respect of a decedent.344 In Revenue Ruling 76-153, 345 the
Service ruled that accrued interest on United States Treasury bonds
known as "flower bonds" that had not been received by the decedent
constituted IRD.346 In addition, in Revenue Ruling 79-340,347 the
I.R.S. ruled that accrued interest on certificates of deposit issued by
Federal Reserve System banks constituted IRD even though the dece-
dent would have forfeited a portion of the interest had he redeemed
the certificate before death. 348
2. Non-Interest-Bearing Obligations Issued at a Discount
Certain debt instruments, including Series E U.S. savings bonds, do
not expressly provide for the payment of interest but are issued at a
discount and are redeemable for fixed amounts which increase at
stated intervals. 34 9 Nonetheless, the increases in redemption value
constitute interest for income tax purposes.350
Congress provided special rules for the taxation of the increase in
value of such non-interest-bearing obligations. If the increase in the
redemption price during a taxable year does not, under the owner's
method of accounting, constitute income, the owner may elect under
340. Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593, 597-98 (6th Cir. 1961).
341. Id. at 596-97.
342. Id. at 597-98.
343. Rev. Rul. 64-104, 1964-1 C.B. 223.
344. Id.
345. Rev. Rul. 76-153, 1976-1 C.B. 180.
346. Id.
347. Rev. Rul. 79-340, 1979-2 C.B. 320.
348. Id. at 321.
349. See Rev. Rul. 58-435, 1958-2 C.B. 370, 371; Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 C.B. 12, 13.
350. See Rev. Rul. 58-435, 1958-2 C.B. 370; Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 C.B. 12.
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section 454(a) to treat the increase as income in that year.351 If the
election is made, it applies to all such obligations owned by the tax-
payer and applies to subsequent tax years. 352 Under section 454(c),
which is limited to matured U.S. savings bonds,353 the owner of Series
E bonds who did not make the section 454(a) election is taxed on the
increased value upon the earlier of their redemption, disposition, or
maturity.354
Assignment of Income
The I.R.S. has issued a number of rulings indicating that the in-
crease in value (accrued interest) of non-interest-bearing obligations
is taxable to the owner at the time of a gratuitous transfer. In Reve-
nue Ruling 54-143, 355 the I.R.S. ruled that the entire increase in value
of Series E savings bonds issued in the names of two individuals was
taxable to the co-owner who provided the entire consideration for
their purchase where the non-contributing owner was permitted to re-
deem the bonds and retain the proceeds.
The very next year, in Revenue Ruling 55-278,356 the I.R.S. ad-
dressed the question of when the increased value (accrued interest) of
Series E savings bonds was taxable where such bonds were transferred
by gift and not redeemed. The Service ruled that a father, who had
purchased the bonds entirely with his own funds and had them issued
in his name and his son's name as co-owners, was taxable on the in-
crease in value when he gratuitously had them issued solely in his
son's name.357 It concluded that the father "realized the benefit of
such interest when he made the gift thereof, since it was then already
earned and he could have realized its benefit in cash payment by ob-
taining redemption of the bonds but chose instead to realize its benefit
in a gift thereof to [his son]. ' '358
In Revenue Ruling 87-112, 359 the I.R.S. ruled that the recognition
on disposition rule applies to transfers made as part of divorce prop-
erty settlements.360 A cash method taxpayer owned Series E savings
bonds registered solely in his name that had been purchased entirely
351. I.R.C. § 454(a).
352. Id.
353. Estate of Noel v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 702, 708 (1968).
354. Treas. Reg. § 1.454-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1971); Rev. Rul. 64-104, 1964-1 C.B. 223.
355. Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 C.B. 12.
356. Rev. Rul. 55-278, 1955-1 C.B. 471.
357. Id. at 473.
358. Id.
359. Rev. Rul. 87-112, 1987-2 C.B. 207.
360. Id. at 208.
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with his own funds.361 The taxpayer transferred the bonds to his for-
mer spouse as part of a divorce property settlement.362 The I.R.S.
ruled that, although section 1041(a) "shields from recognition gain
that would ordinarily be recognized on a sale or exchange of property,
it does not shield from recognition income that is ordinarily recog-
nized upon the assignment of that income to another taxpayer. '363
The increased value of the bonds was determined to be "accrued but
unrecognized interest," which the transferor was required to include
in income for the taxable year in which the transfer was made pursu-
ant to the recognition on disposition rule in the regulations. 364
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Income in respect of a decedent does not include amounts that were
properly includible in the decedent's return for his final year or a prior
year. 365 If the decedent made the section 454(a) election during his
life, the increase in value (accrued interest) that occurred during his
life would have been includible in the decedent's returns.366 If the
decedent did not make the election, the executor of his estate can
make the election for the decedent on his final return and the pre-
death increase in value will be included in the decedent's final income
tax return.367 Consequently, the increased value (accrued interest) of
non-interest-bearing obligations constitutes income in respect of a de-
cedent only where neither the decedent nor his executor acting on his
behalf made the section 454(a) election.
In 1957, the Treasury issued regulations specifically providing that
interest accrued during the life of an owner of Series E U.S. savings
bonds is income in respect of a decedent.368 The following year, in
Revenue Ruling 58-435,369 the I.R.S. similarly ruled that the pre-death
increase in value (accrued interest) of Series E bonds purchased by a
cash basis decedent entirely with her own funds was gross income in




364. Id. Revenue Ruling 87-112 and application of assignment of income principles in the
divorce context attracted substantial criticism. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 315, at 84; Nunnal-
lee, supra note 311, at 616.
365. I.R.C. § 691(a).
366. Id. § 454(a).
367. Id. § 6903 (providing that a person acting as a fiduciary for another "shall assume the
powers, rights, duties, and privileges of such other person in respect of a tax" except as otherwise
provided); Rev. Rul. 79-409, 1979-2 C.B. 208; Rev. Rul. 68-145, 1968-1 C.B. 203.
368. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) ex. (3) (1957).
369. Rev. Rul. 58-435, 1958-2 C.B. 370.
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made by or for the decedent. Whether the bonds had been issued in
the decedent's name alone or in the decedent's name and that of an-
other as co-owners did not matter. 370 The Service reached the same
conclusion a few years later in Revenue Ruling 64-104.371 And, in
1986, the Tax Court cited the Service's 1964 ruling and summarily held
that accrued interest on Series E bonds is income in respect of a dece-
dent unless it was properly includible in the decedent's returns. 372
B. Compensation for Services
1. Bonuses, Fees, Salaries, and Wages
Assignment of Income
In Lucas v. Earl,373 the Supreme Court had to decide whether tax-
payers could make anticipatory assignments of compensation income
that would be effective for federal income tax purposes. Earl and his
wife, by a contract executed before the federal income tax became
effective, agreed that all of their earnings would be received by them
as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 374 The issue was whether
Earl was to be taxed on one-half or all of his salary and attorney's fees
that he had earned for the years in question. 375 The taxpayer con-
tended he was taxable only on one-half of those amounts-the sum to
which he was entitled and in fact received as a result of the contract.376
In its landmark decision, the Court found that the applicable code
sections imposed a tax on the net income of every individual including
"income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal
service. '377 It decided the case on the basis of the statute:
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who
earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by antic-
ipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to
prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute
before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to
the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are at-
tributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.378
370. Id.
371. Rev. Rul. 64-104, 1964-1 C.B. 223, 225.
372. Apkin v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 692, 694 (1986).
373. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
374. Id. at 113-14.
375. Id. at 113.
376. Id. at 114.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 114-15.
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Earl was taxed on the compensation income attributable solely to his
efforts (economic activities). 379
In 1973, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the assignment of income
doctrine in the compensation context. In United States v. Basye,380 the
Court held that payment of compensation income into a retirement
trust for the benefit of partners triggered "familiar and long-settled
principles of income and partnership taxation," requiring the income
to be taxed to the partners at the time of payment.381 It relied on two
principles of taxation:
[F]irst, that income is taxed to the party who earns it and that liabil-
ity may not be avoided through an anticipatory assignment of that
income, and second, that partners are taxable on their distributive
or proportionate shares of current partnership income irrespective
of whether that income is actually distributed to them.382
Since the partnership had received a definite amount of income, the
partners were taxable on their distributive shares even though none
knew with certainty how much, if any, he would ultimately receive. 383
These cases, however, do not establish an absolute rule that a pro-
vider of services is always taxed on things of value attributable to his
services. Exceptions have been recognized where the provider was an
agent, fiduciary, or a person of similar status.384
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Courts have concluded that post-death payments attributable to a
decedent's employment constitute income in respect of a decedent.
385
This is the case even if the decedent had no legally enforceable right
to receive the payment at the time of his death386 or could never have
received the amount in question.387 Only if the taxpayer can establish
that the amount was a gift excludable under section 102(a) will such
amounts escape taxation as income in respect of a decedent.
388
379. Id. at 114.
380. 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
381. Id. at 457.
382. Id. at 447-48.
383. Id. at 455-56.
384. Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003, 1007 (1962); Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2 C.B. 25;
Rev. Rul. 69-274, 1969-1 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 58-515, 1958-2 C.B. 28; Rev. Rul. 58-220, 1958-1 C.B.
26.
385. See, e.g., Rollert Residuary Trust v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1985);
Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); O'Daniel's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
386. Rollert Residuary Trust, 752 F.2d at 1128; Bausch's Estate, 186 F.2d at 313; O'Daniel's
Estate, 173 F.2d at 966.
387. See infra Part V.B.3.
388. See I.R.C. § 102(a); Rev.Rul. 68-124, 1968-1 C.B. 44.
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Courts initially used the economic activity test to conclude that pay-
ments attributable to a decedent's services were income in respect of a
decedent.389 Those early opinions represented a logical extension of
Lucas v. Earl to earned income transferred at death under section
691's statutory scheme. Later, after the economic activities test had
been displaced by the right to income test, courts found the necessary
right existed to cause such amounts to be IRD. In Rollert Residuary
Trust v. Commissioner,390 "a case factually identical" to O'Daniel's
Estate v. Commissioner which had been decided under the economic
activities test, the court held an employee bonus was income in re-
spect of a decedent because there was a substantial certainty that the
decedent would have received the bonus had he lived.391 The court
held "[t]he key test for determining whether decedent had a 'right' or
was 'entitled' to the post-mortem bonus should be based on the likeli-
hood, at the time of his death, that he would receive the bonus, not on
his legal rights to it.'"392
Post-death taxation of employment-related amounts solely attribu-
table to a decedent's activities as income in respect of a decedent,
however, should not depend on an assessment of the likelihood that a
decedent would have received the amounts had he lived. While such a
determination is relevant in valuing the item for estate tax purposes, it
should not be a factor in determining whether "earned" income was
transferred at death. 393 Lifetime assignments of compensatory
("earned") income have been ineffective for income tax purposes
since the 1930 decision in Lucas v. Earl. If such "earned" income is
received by a decedent's successor after his death, it should be taxed
as income in respect of a decedent under section 691 by analogy.394
2. Insurance Renewal Commissions
Assignment of Income
Assignment of the right to receive compensation income triggers
the assignment of income doctrine, regardless of whether the assign-
389. See, e.g., Bausch's Estate, 186 F.2d at 313; O'Daniel's Estate, 173 F.2d at 966.
390. Rollert Residuary Trust, 752 F.2d at 1128.
391. Id. at 1132.
392. Id.
393. See Eustice, supra note 26, at 43 (suggesting in the assignment of income context that the
uncertain nature of a particular income right at the time of its transfer should not obscure the
"question of whom is the proper person to pay the tax on such income when it does eventually
become reportable").
394. See Freyburger, supra note 97, at 967 ("If the object of [the] ... Revenue Act of 1942 was
to tax all income to somebody, then it might well be argued that all payments which represent
compensation for services rendered by an employee ... are taxable under section 126.").
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ment occurs before or after performance. 395 In the personal service
context, the fruit-tree metaphor "regards the performer of the services
as the tree and his compensation as the fruit. '396
In 1924 and 1928, Gerald A. Eubank gratuitously assigned insur-
ance renewal commissions that would become payable to him for
services he had rendered in writing insurance policies.397 In Helvering
v. Eubank,398 a companion case to Helvering v. Horst, the Supreme
Court summarily held Eubank taxable in 1933 on commissions paid in
that year to his assignees "[f]or the reasons stated at length in the
opinion in the Horst case. 399
Income in Respect of a Decedent
In 1957, in Latendresse v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit held
that insurance renewal commissions that had been earned by a dece-
dent while acting as an agent were income in respect of a decedent.
400
The fact that the commissions were contingent on future premium
payments was irrelevant.401 Six months after the decision in Laten-
dresse, the Treasury issued regulations which provided that insurance
renewal commissions paid after death on policies sold by decedents
are income in respect of a decedent.40 2
Two subsequent decisions involving renewal commissions illustrate
the unnecessary complexity introduced by the judicially developed
IRD tests and why IRD should be identified by reference to assign-
ment of income cases. In 1964, the Second Circuit utilized the eco-
nomic activities test and held renewal commissions paid pursuant to a
contract negotiated by the decedent were income in respect of a dece-
dent because they were clearly attributable to the decedent's business
activities. 40 3 The court's determination was consistent with Helvering
v. Eubank and taxation of the decedent's successors on "earned" in-
come transferred at death under section 691.404 Shortly thereafter, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the economic activities test and adopted the
right to income test.405 Halliday v. United States406 required the Fifth
395. Lyon & Eustice, supra note 26, at 388-89.
396. Id. at 389; see Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996)
397. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124 (1940).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 125.
400. 243 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1957).
401. Latendresse v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 318, 325 (1956), affd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957).
402. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) ex. (2) (1957).
403. Findlay v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1964).
404. Id.
405. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
406. 655 F.2d 68, 72 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Circuit to determine whether renewal commissions paid pursuant to
company policy, rather than contract, were IRD. The trial court had
concluded the commissions were not IRD under the right to income
test because the decedent had no legally enforceable right to receive
the commissions. 40 7 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the legally
enforceable right requirement and held that "a right to income arises
where the evidence shows a substantial certainty that benefits directly
related to decedent's past economic activities will be paid" upon his
death.40 8 It concluded the decedent possessed such a right and held
the commissions were IRD.40 9
The issue under section 691 is whether "earned" income or property
was transferred at death. Insurance renewal commissions solely at-
tributable to the economic efforts of the decedent are no less
"earned" income than other employment-related amounts. The con-
tingent nature of the commissions is immaterial in the determination
of their character.410 Courts should not determine whether compensa-
tion-related amounts are IRD by assessing the likelihood of payment.
If a court were to determine, as of the date of death, that there was no
substantial certainty that such an item would be received, items that
should be taxed as IRD would escape taxation. Regardless of the
probability of payment at death, amounts attributable solely to a dece-
dent's personal services should be income in respect of a decedent and
taxed if and when received.
3. Amounts Never Payable to the Earner
Assignment of Income
The assignment of income doctrine applies equally to assignments
of compensation income already earned and compensation income to
be earned in the future. Courts, since Lucas v. Earl, have long held
that the earner of personal service income cannot avoid its taxation by
arranging for payment to a third party by anticipatory assignment,
even if the assignment entitles the third party to the amounts under
local law.
Under this principle, for example, courts have held that amounts
paid by employers to employees' children under employer-funded ed-
ucational benefit plans constitute compensation for services to the em-
407. Id. at 70.
408. Id. at 72.
409. Id.
410. See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b)(3) (as amended in 1965) (providing that income in respect
of a decedent includes "[i]ncome to which the decedent had a contingent claim at the time of his
death").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ployees under section 61.411 The tax result in such cases does not
depend on whether the employer bargained directly with the employ-
ees for the benefits under the plans, 412 whether the employees had a
right to receive the funds or control their disposition,413 or whether
the payments satisfied a legal obligation of the employees to their chil-
dren.414 The educational benefits were considered to represent a part
of the benefit package provided to the employees, and to confer an
economic benefit upon them and were taxable to the employees under
the principle that income is to be taxed to the one who earns it.415
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Courts have similarly held that compensation-related amounts paid
after death are income in respect of a decedent even though the dece-
dent did not have a right to receive the amounts at death.41 6 A con-
trary conclusion would provide an unintended loophole in the code by
encouraging employees to negotiate for payment of part of their com-
pensation after their deaths. 417 If such amounts were not IRD, not
only would the earner of the income have avoided taxation on the
income during life, but his surrogate under section 691 would escape
taxation at death.
In 1927, Francis C. Carr released his employer from all claims for
commissions then due him in return for the employer's promise to
make payments to designated beneficiaries after his death.418 In Es-
tate of Carr v. Commissioner,419 the Tax Court held payments made in
1953-57 pursuant to the 1927 contract were income in respect of a
411. See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that
college fund created for employee's children constituted income under section 61); Saunders v.
Commissioner, 720 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that college scholarship and loan
program for employee's children constituted income under section 61); Armantrout v. Commis-
sioner, 570 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that college fund created for employee's
children constituted income under section 61).
412. Wheeler, 768 F.2d at 1335.
413. Id. at 1334.
414. Id. at 1335.
415. Id.; Armantrout, 570 F.2d at 213.
416. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 389 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Estate of
Nilssen v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 382 (D. Minn. 1971); Collins v. United States, 318 F. Supp.
382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Bernard v. United States,
215 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Estate of Carr v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1173 (1962); see also
FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:32 ("If before death the decedent assigns rights to deferred
personal service income, application of § 691 is unaffected.... In such a situation, the decedent
has deliberately chosen to forgo current income, to which he or she had a sort of entitlement, in
favor of a survivor. Taxation of such income to the survivor seems entirely appropriate.").
417. Freyburger, supra note 97, at 967.
418. Estate of Carr, 37 T.C. at 1175.
419. Id.
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decedent.420 A district court reached the same conclusion regarding
similar payments in Bernard v. United States.421 The decedent had en-
tered into contracts under which his employers agreed to pay his wife
certain amounts upon his death in recognition of services he had ren-
dered.422 The court held it was not necessary that the decedent would
have been entitled to receive the amounts had he lived in order for the
amounts to be IRD, "[o]therwise all payments that commenced upon
death would escape income tax."' 423 The payments were held to be
income in respect of a decedent under the economic activities test.424
Courts have reached the same conclusion under the right to income
test. In Collins v. United States,425 the district court concluded that
payments made pursuant to an employment contract were IRD even
though the decedent could never have received the amounts in ques-
tion.426 The court suggested that a decedent's entitlement to post-
death payments attributable to his personal services was "simply not
relevant. '427 If the "decedent's entitlement is a sine qua non of in-
come in respect of a decedent," however, the court held the decedent
had been entitled to the income by virtue of his bargaining and con-
trol over who would receive payment.428 The very next year, a district
court reached the same conclusion in Estate of Nilssen v. United
States.429 It concluded that "[t]he courts have uniformly held that
post-death payments to an employee's widow are to be treated as 'in-
come in respect of a decedent' despite the fact that under the terms of
the employment contract, the employee would never be entitled to
actual receipt of the income. '430
C. Corporate Liquidation Distributions
Assignment of Income
A number of cases have arisen where shareholders, after com-
mencement of actions to liquidate corporations, transferred stock and
their assignees subsequently received liquidating distributions. The
420. Id. at 1179.
421. Bernard, 215 F. Supp. at 256.
422. Id. at 258.
423. Id. at 260.
424. Id.
425. 318 F. Supp. 382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
426. Id. at 389.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. 322 F. Supp. 260 (D. Minn. 1971).
430. Id. at 265.
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cases generally involved the transfer of stock to family members431 or
to charitable entities.432 The issue was whether a right to income (liq-
uidation proceeds) or property (stock) had been transferred. 433
In October 1941, Midland Printing Company commenced negotia-
tions to sell its printing and binding business.434 Assets the company
had devoted to those businesses were sold before December 15,
1941. 435 At a special meeting held December 15, 1941, the sharehold-
ers approved the earlier sales, agreed to sell the company's remaining
assets, and voted to liquidate the corporation before December 31,
1941.436 On December 23, 1941, Howard Cook, a shareholder, gave
sixty of his shares of stock to each of his two sons.437 Cook's sons
subsequently received cash in liquidation of their shares. 438
In Cook v. Commissioner,439 the Tax Court held Cook taxable on
the gain upon liquidation of the shares. 440 "[L]ooking to realities
rather than formalities," the court concluded that Cook had intended
to, and did, make gifts of liquidation distributions rather than of
stock.' 1 At the time of the transfer, most corporate assets had been
sold, the sale of the remainder had been authorized, the shareholders
had voted to liquidate the corporation, and the corporation was in the
process of liquidation.442 The court rejected Cook's contention that
he should not be taxed because the liquidation was not complete when
the gifts were made and the resolution to liquidate could have been
rescinded."43 Although the court conceded the correctness of Cook's
arguments "as a matter of corporate formalities," the court was con-
cerned with the "actualities" which indicated the liquidation would be
completed.4 4
431. See, e.g., Cook v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 908 (1945).
432. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343, 1344 (6th Cir. 1976); Kinsey v. Commis-
sioner, 477 F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir. 1973); Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 276 (8th Cir.
1972).
433. See Hudspeth, 471 F.2d at 278 ("What has the taxpayer given-stock or liquidation
proceeds?").
434. Cook, 5 T.C. at 909.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 909-10.
438. Id. at 910.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 912.
441. Id. at 911.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 911-12.
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Twenty-one years later, in 1966, the district court in Jacobs v. United
States4 5 reached a contrary conclusion on facts similar to those in
Cook. Edward A. Jacobs transferred stock to a charitable foundation
after shareholder adoption of a plan of liquidation and corporate fil-
ing of a statement of intent to dissolve.4 46 The foundation received
liquidating distributions approximately three months after the trans-
fer.447 The court rejected Cook, finding the difference between the
facts "so readily apparent that discussion of them is not warranted." 448
It held Jacobs was not to be taxed on the liquidating distribution be-
cause he had no absolute and indefeasible right to the liquidation dis-
tributions.449 It rejected a "likelihood" analysis, noting that "[i]n spite
of the arguments concerning the unlikelihood of a repudiation of the
dissolution proceedings prior to their finality, the fact remains that
such abandonment was entirely possible. ' 450 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed for the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion. 451
In Rushing v. Commissioner,4 52 the Tax Court distinguished Cook
and relied upon Jacobs in a case that did not involve a gift, but install-
ment sales of stock after adoption of liquidation plans.45 3 Rushing,
consequently, did not involve an attempt to assign income or to
change the character of the gain from ordinary income to capital
gain.454 Nonetheless, the I.R.S. contended that the former sharehold-
ers should be taxed when the liquidating distributions were made,
rather than when payments were received under the installment
method.455 The Tax Court found control over the liquidation after the
transfer determinative.45 6 Cook was distinguished on that basis.457
The minority shareholder-donees in Cook lacked control; the only
shareholder-purchasers in Rushing possessed control and could have
voted to rescind the liquidation resolutions.45 8 Jacobs, a case in which
the Tax Court found the transferors continued to exercise control over
the liquidation in a fiduciary capacity, was cited in support of the
445. 280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohio 1966), affid, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968).
446. Id. at 438.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 439.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Jacobs v. United States, 390 F.2d 877, 878 (6th Cir. 1968).
452. 52 T.C. 888 (1969), affd, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
453. Id. at 896.
454. Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1971).
455. Rushing, 52 T.C. at 897.
456. Id. at 897-98.
457. Id. at 897.
458. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Rushing court's holding that the taxpayers were not to be taxed upon
the liquidation. 459 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding control determi-
native460 and holding the sale had deprived the taxpayers of the right
to the liquidation distributions. 461
In 1971, a district court used the Jacobs entitlement test and held a
taxpayer was not taxable on the liquidation of shares he had gratui-
tously transferred in Hudspeth v. United States.462 The court found
existence of the right to liquidation proceeds dependent on whether
the liquidation plan was reversible under local law.463 The Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed for two reasons. First, it held the liquidation was irre-
versible under local law.464 Secondly, the court, citing Cook, rejected
the Jacobs test, holding "that the realities and substance of the events
must govern our determination, rather than the formalities and re-
mote hypothetical possibilities. '465 The court then considered the fac-
tors to be used to determine whether the transfer was of stock or
liquidation proceeds.
The Eighth Circuit found early cases had held the shareholders' af-
firmative vote to liquidate was the critical legal step necessary to effect
a "realization" of stock gain. 466 Rushing, however, had added "a new
dimension" to the analysis by holding that the shareholders' vote was
not sufficient to constitute realization.467 The court read Rushing:
[A]s evincing the proposition that if the donor or vendor transfers a
controlling interest in a corporation, such that the transferee will
have the legal capacity to suspend or rescind the liquidation and
thereby have the power to supersede the donor's initial intent to
provide the donee only with the otherwise imminent liquidation
proceeds, then the gains are not taxable to the transferor. But, in
the case where the taxpayer retains control of the corporation and
the transferee will be unable to vitiate the taxpayer's intent to liqui-
date, the shareholders' vote remains sufficient to constitute the nec-
essary severance of gain.468
459. Id. at 897-98.
460. Rushing, 441 F.2d at 598 ("As we understand the test, in order to receive the installment
sale benefits the seller may not directly or indirectly have control over the proceeds or possess
the economic benefit therefrom.").
461. Id.
462. 335 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (1971), rev'd, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
463. Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1972).
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 278.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 278-79.
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The taxpayer in Hudspeth was found to have retained control of the
liquidation through retention of a majority of the corporation's stock
and was held taxable on the liquidation distribution to his donees.469
The Second Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's approach in Kinsey
v. Commissioner.4 70 It examined the "realities and substance of the
events" and concluded the taxpayer's transfer of stock was an antici-
patory assignment of liquidation proceeds. 471 It based its holding on
the fact that the decision to liquidate could only have been reversed
by a two-thirds vote; the donee did not own the necessary two-thirds;
and, if other shareholders had joined with the donee to satisfy the
two-thirds requirement, previous distributions might have been taxed
as ordinary, rather than capital, gain income.472
Three years later, in 1976, the Sixth Circuit followed Hudspeth and
Kinsey and overruled its decision in Jacobs. In Jones v. United
States,473 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the realities and substance
of events, not hypothetical possibilities, should govern the determina-
tion of whether an anticipatory assignment of income had occurred. 4
74
The court held the taxpayer-donor taxable on liquidation distributions
because the facts indicated completion of the liquidation was a practi-
cal certainty at the time of her stock transfers. 475 It based its conclu-
sion on the fact that the liquidation was being conducted under
section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code; if the liquidation was not
completed, the corporation would be taxed on gain from assets that
had been sold; and the shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of
liquidation (968,605 to 175).476 Donor or donee control over the liqui-
dation was not regarded as determinative but was only one factor to
be considered in deciding whether the liquidation was practically cer-
tain to be completed. 477
Income in Respect of a Decedent
In 1969, the year after it had affirmed the district court's opinion in
Jacobs, the Sixth Circuit decided Keck v. Commissioner.4 78 Decedent
469. Id. at 279.
470. 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
471. Id. at 1063.
472. Id.
473. Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
474. Id. at 1345.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1346 & n.3.
478. 415 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1969).
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Shaw owned minority interests in three affiliated corporations.479 In
1956, the corporations entered an agreement to sell their assets that
was contingent upon approval of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (I.C.C.).480 Liquidation of the corporations was contemplated
and a private ruling was obtained from the Service which indicated
section 337 would apply.481 Decedent died November 27, 1958, before
I.C.C. approval had been obtained. 482 That approval was received
May 5, 1960, and, shortly thereafter, the sale was completed and liqui-
dation distributions were made to the decedent's successors. 483 The
issue in Keck was whether the post-death distributions were income in
respect of a decedent.484
Since two of the three judges who decided Jacobs and Keck were
the same, it is not surprising that the district court opinion affirmed in
Jacobs and the Sixth Circuit opinion in Keck reveal a similar analysis
or that the government lost both cases. Jacobs485 and Keck486 both
used the right to income test. Jacobs held a transferor of stock was
not taxable on liquidation proceeds because the fact that the liquida-
tion could have been abandoned meant he had no right to the pro-
ceeds.487 Keck held post-death liquidation proceeds were not income
in respect of a decedent because contingencies at death meant the de-
cedent had no right to the proceeds.488 Jacobs rejected a likelihood of
completion analysis. 489 Keck did not even mention such an analysis.
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the similarity between the
cases, the court in Keck never cited Jacobs.
The Tax Court's 1976 decision in Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner490
preceded Jones but followed in the wake of Hudspeth and Kinsey.
The court had to decide whether a liquidation distribution received by
an estate constituted income in respect of a decedent where the trans-
fer at death followed adoption of a plan of complete liquidation.491
On February 28, 1968, the board of directors of a corporation adopted





484. Id. at 533.
485. Jacobs v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 437, 439 (S.D. Ohio 1966), affd, 390 F.2d 877 (6th
Cir. 1968).
486. Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1969).
487. Jacobs, 280 F. Supp. at 439.
488. Keck, 415 F.2d at 534-35.
489. Jacobs, 280 F. Supp. at 439.
490. 65 T.C. 873 (1976), affid, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
491. Id. at 873.
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a plan of complete liquidation.492 Sidles, the sole shareholder, ap-
proved the liquidation on the same day.493 On February 29, 1968, the
corporation filed a statement of intent to dissolve with the secretary of
state.494 Sidles died four months later.495 The liquidation was com-
pleted five months after the decedent's death with distribution to the
decedent's estate.496
The Tax Court held the decedent must have possessed a right to
income at the time of his death in order for the post-death payment to
constitute income in respect of a decedent.4 97 Whether the decedent
possessed such a right was a question of fact to be determined by ex-
amination of relevant factors.498 The court indicated that one of those
factors was whether the amounts received after death resulted from
the decedent's economic activities and efforts.499 The Tax Court con-
cluded that the right to income test required the court to determine
"whether the transaction had sufficiently matured as of decedent's
death so as to create in him a right to receive the income when it was
subsequently realized. '500
After examining the facts, the court concluded the decedent had the
necessary right to the liquidating distribution at the time of his
death.501 The court noted that the decedent's actions were the source
of the distribution, his vote for liquidation had created the right to
receive the distribution, and the estate's right to the proceeds resulted
solely from the decedent's death and not from its own efforts. 502 The
fact that Sidles, as sole shareholder, could have rescinded the transac-
tion was unimportant since he had not done so.50 3 The court, citing
Hudspeth and Kinsey for comparison, concluded that Sidles "had per-
formed enough substantive acts within his control to perfect his right
to receive the liquidating distribution for purposes of section 691."504
The Eighth Circuit, which had decided Hudspeth, affirmed without a
published opinion. 505









501. Id. at 881 n.6.
502. Id. at 881.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
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The Tax Court's decision in Sidles, however, was not unanimous.
TWo judges concurred in the conclusion that the amounts were IRD in
large part because of the control the decedent possessed over the liq-
uidation as sole shareholder.50 6 These judges found the facts closely
akin to those in Hudspeth and would have applied the rationale in that
case even though it had arisen in the assignment of income context.50 7
Three judges dissented on the grounds that the liquidation had not
proceeded to a point beyond the control of the sole shareholder.50 8
They, too, relied upon the assignment of income cases but concluded
the sole shareholder's right to rescind the liquidation "eviscerated any
claim to a 'right' to the liquidation proceeds. ' 509
In 1985, the Tax Court again held post-death liquidation proceeds to
be income in respect of a decedent. In Estate of Bickmeyer v. Com-
missioner,510 the decedent had owned practically all of the shares in
one corporation and one-fourth of the shares in another.511 During
his life, a county initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire the
assets of both corporations. 512 After the application for condemna-
tion was granted, the county had taken possession and paid the corpo-
rations the appraised value of the property.513 Bickmeyer died after
the corporations had voted to liquidate and after partial liquidating
distributions had been made.514 Litigation regarding the value of the
assets was not concluded until after the decedent's death and final
liquidation distributions were made to his estate.515
The court, citing Sidles, held that the tax result depended on
"whether the transaction had sufficiently matured as of decedent's
death so as to create in him a right to receive the income when it was
subsequently realized. ' 516 On the facts, the court held that the liqui-
dation had progressed to the point where the decedent was entitled to
receive the liquidation proceeds.517 It relied, in part, on Hudspeth,
noting that, while abandonment of the "impending dissolution may
have been technically or theoretically possible, 'the realities and sub-
506. Estate of Sidles, 65 T.C. at 887 (Hall, J., concurring).
507. Id. at 890.
508. Id. at 896 (Featherston, J., dissenting).
509. Id.
510. Estate of Bickmeyer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 170 (1985).
511. Id. at 171.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 172.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 175 (quoting Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 880 (1976)).
517. Id. at 176.
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stance of the events must govern our determination, rather than for-
malities and remote hypothetical possibilities.' '5 18
D. Farm Products
1. Crops and Livestock Received as Rent
Assignment of Income
In Revenue Ruling 63-66,519 the I.R.S. addressed the income tax
consequences of a gift of crops that had been received as rent under a
cropshare lease. The taxpayer gave the crops to his children prior to
their sale. The Service, before dealing with the assignment of income
question, noted the special rule in the regulations that cropshares re-
ceived as rent are to be included in gross income when reduced to
money or its equivalent,520 rather than when received. Finding
Helvering v. Horst analogous, 521 the Service ruled that the taxpayer
had made a gift of rental income, not unrealized asset appreciation,
and was taxable on the rent when the crops were reduced to money or
its equivalent by his children.
The Fifth Circuit was required to determine the correctness of the
revenue ruling in Tatum v. Commissioner.5 22 The Tatums donated
crops which they had received as rent under cropshare leases to chari-
ties. 52 3 The charities sold the crops during the year in which they had
been transferred.52 4 The court distinguished crops held by operating
farmers from crops held by landlords that had been received as
rent.52 5 Raised crops held by operating farmers were appreciated
property not includible in income until the occurrence of a taxable
event.526 Crops held by landlords that had been received as rent, on
the other hand, were "rental income assets no less than money paid
for the same purpose, 52 7 taxable when reduced to money or its
equivalent under the regulations.5 28 The fact that the regulations de-
ferred reporting of the rental income did not change their character as
potential income assets rather than appreciated property.5 29 As such,
518. Id. at 179 (quoting Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1972)).
519. Rev. Rul. 63-66, 1963-1 C.B. 13, modified, Rev. Rul. 75-11, 1975-1 C.B. 1.
520. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4).
521. Id. at 14.
522. 400 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1968).
523. Id. at 243.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 245-46.
526. Id. at 246.
527. Id. at 247.
528. Id. at 246.
529. Id. at 247-48.
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the assignment of income principles of Helvering v. Horst applied. 530
Because the gift and the donee's sale occurred during the same tax
year in Tatum, the court did not have to decide when the income
would have been taxable if the gift and sale had taken place in differ-
ent years.531
In Revenue Ruling 75-11,532 the I.R.S. addressed the timing issue
left unresolved in Tatum. The I.R.S. ruled that the donor of crops that
had been received as rent recognizes gross income at the time they are
transferred by gift, not when the donee later reduces the crops to
money or its equivalent. 533 It based this departure from the usual as-
signment of income rule, under which the donor is taxed when the
income is realized (received) by the donee, on the grounds that crop-
shares are realized income whose taxation is deferred under the regu-
lations until reduced to cash.534 The Service ruled that "[w]hen crop
shares are given away, the continuation of this deferral privilege does
not serve the purpose of providing cash with which to pay the farmer-
landlord's tax, since it is the donee, not the farmer-landlord, who
eventually will convert the crops to cash. '535
Income in Respect of a Decedent
In Revenue Ruling 58-436,536 the I.R.S. discussed the character of
unsold crops received by a decedent as rent that were transferred at
death. Relying on Estate of Burnett v. Commissioner,537 a case de-
cided under section 42 of pre-1943 law, the I.R.S. ruled that the crops
constituted property, not income in respect of a decedent.538 The
crops did not represent a right to receive income but were held to be
assets which the decedent could have converted into money or its
equivalent. 539
The Court of Claims considered the character of cropshares held by
a decedent in Estate of Davison v. United States.540 Davison died in
1952. In 1953, her estate was paid for crops received as rent that were
sold after the decedent's death.541 The court concluded that Congress,
530. Id. at 248.
531. Id.
532. Rev. Rul. 75-11, 1975-1 C.B. 27.
533. Id. at 28.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 C.B. 366, 369.
537. 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
538. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 C.B. 366, 368.
539. Id.
540. 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. CI. 1961).
541. Id. at 938.
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by enacting section 691, had intended to tax income earned, but not
reported, by a decedent during his life.542 It held that "[c]rops re-
ceived as rent exist in the hands of the lessor as a unique kind of prop-
erty which can be described, like a right to receive future income, as a
potential income asset. ' 543 If a decedent died while possessing such
crops, the essential income nature of the crops would follow them and
they would be income in respect of a decedent. 544 Revenue Ruling
58-436 was rejected as an improper extension of Burnett, a case in
which no rents had been involved.545
Not surprisingly, within in a few years, the I.R.S. modified Revenue
Ruling 58-436 in light of Davison.546 In Revenue Ruling 64-289, the
I.R.S. deleted the portion of the earlier ruling holding that crops and
livestock received as rent transferred at death do not constitute in-
come in respect of a decedent.547 If the decedent died during a rental
period, the I.R.S. indicated that only the portion of the net share pro-
ceeds attributable to the period ending with the death were IRD; the
portion attributable to the post-death period were section 61 gross in-
come. The Service excepted from the ruling, however, "items re-
ceived in a sharing arrangement in which the landowner, as well as the
tenant, participates materially in the farming operation. '548
2. Raised Crops and Livestock
Assignment of Income
In 1948, the I.R.S. issued two rulings involving raised crops and live-
stock and assignment of income principles.549 In I.T. 3910, the I.R.S.
ruled that the fair market value of raised wheat contributed by a
farmer to a charitable organization was includible in the farmer's
gross income.550 The raised crops were held to be "in the nature of
income" and the satisfaction derived from their contribution to a char-
itable organization resulted in the enjoyment of income within the
rule established in Helvering v. Horst.551 The I.R.S. extended its rul-
ing to noncharitable gifts of raised cattle held primarily for resale in
542. Id. at 941.
543. Id. at 942.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 942-43.
546. Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 179.
549. I.T. 3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15, revoked, Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223, 226; I.T. 3932, 1948-
2 C.B. 7, revoked, Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 C.B. 520, 522.
550. I.T. 3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15, 16, revoked, Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223, 226.
551. Id.
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I.T. 3932.552 According to the I.R.S., the fair market value of the cat-
tle was includible in the donor's gross income in the year the gift was
made.553 "Both rulings rested on the proposition that appreciation in
an income item, the growing crop or livestock, was realized when the
farmer assigned his interest to another." 554
The Fifth Circuit considered the correctness of the Service's rulings
in Campbell v. Prothro.5 55 Prothro gave one hundred raised calves to
a charitable association by written instrument.5 56 The calves, how-
ever, were never physically segregated from others owned by the tax-
payer and were sold along with the others as a single lot five months
later.557 The I.R.S. relied on assignment of income principles and its
1948 rulings in attempting to include the fair market value of the gift
in Prothro's gross income. 558 The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the
contention that assignment of income principles applied.5 59 It held
the transfer of appreciated property did not trigger assignment of in-
come principles because mere appreciation does not constitute taxa-
ble income.5 60 A sale or exchange was necessary to convert
appreciated property into income.561
Other courts similarly rejected the I.R.S. characterization of raised
crops and livestock as income items 562 and the I.R.S. subsequently re-
voked its 1948 rulings.563
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Estate of Burnett v. Commissioner,564 a case decided under section
42 of pre-1943 law, must be considered before the IRD issue is ad-
552. I.T. 3932, 1948-1 C.B. 7, 8, revoked, Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 C.B. 520, 522.
553. Id.
554. Tatum v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1968).
555. 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
556. Id. at 332 n.2.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 333-34.
559. Id. at 335.
560. Id. at 335-36.
561. Id.; see Lyons & Eustice, supra note 26, at 381 (noting that a contrary holding would have
meant that taxable income would have resulted from gifts of appreciated property and that
"[tlhe language of section 1015 of the Code, which gives the donee the donor's carryover basis
for the gift property without increase for any gain recognized on the gift, seemed clearly to
militate against such a conclusion in the view of the courts").
562. See Tatum v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing White v. Brodrick,
104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952); Estate of W.G. Farrier, 15 T.C. 277 (1950); and Elsie SoRelle,
22 T.C. 459 (1954))..
563. Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223, 226, modified, Rev. Rul. 68-69, 1968-1 C.B. 80; Rev.
Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 C.B. 520, 522.
564. 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
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dressed because it played an important role in the development of the
law. Tom Burnett, a taxpayer whose principal business was cattle
ranching, died December 26, 1938.565 At the time of his death, Bur-
nett owned raised livestock and feedstuffs.566 The I.R.S. contended
that the value of both were gross income that had "accrued" and were
includible in Burnett's final return under section 42.567 The Tax Court
disagreed, holding that it did "not think the mere ownership of this
property by decedent at the time of his death, even though it had been
produced on his ranches during his lifetime, caused it to be gross in-
come accrued to him up to the date of his death" absent a sale or
exchange. 568
In Revenue Ruling 58-436,569 the I.R.S. announced that the princi-
ples in Burnett were equally applicable in determining what consti-
tutes income in respect of a decedent. It ruled that livestock and farm
crops (harvested or unharvested) raised by a cash basis decedent, re-
gardless of whether held for sale or feeding purposes, constituted
items of property and not IRD where the decedent had engaged in no
realization event prior to death. 570 However, the proceeds would be
IRD if the decedent had:
disposed of his livestock and farm crops, whether by sale or by some
other arrangement which technically did not amount to a sale but
which had put his property beyond his dominion and control, so
that at the date of his death he was entitled only to receive the
agreed proceeds from such property.571
E. Sales Proceeds
A sale, exchange, or other disposition of property is generally held
to occur upon the earlier of the transfer of title or the transfer of the
burdens and benefits of ownership.5 72 If the general rule were an ab-
solute rule, however, gain from the taxable disposition of property
could easily be shifted by the property's transfer before a sale closed
in violation of assignment of income principles. Not surprisingly,
courts have sought to prevent such actions.
565. Id. at 898.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 900.
568. Id. at 903.
569. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 C.B. 366, 367, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173.
570. Id. at 369.
571. Id. at 368.
572. See Rev. Rul. 82-1, 1982-1 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971.1 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 69-93,
1969-1 C.B. 139.
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Discussion of sales proceeds and the assignment of income doctrine
begins with the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co.573 In Court Holding, a corporation had engaged in
negotiations for the sale of an apartment building and had reached an
oral agreement for its sale.574 When the corporate officers and pur-
chaser met to reduce the agreement to writing, they were advised by
the corporation's lawyer of the large income tax that would result to
the corporation if it sold the property as planned.575 No contract was
executed at the meeting and the property was distributed to the cor-
poration's two shareholders the next day.576 The shareholders subse-
quently sold the property to the purchaser on substantially the same
terms as had been negotiated by the corporation. 577
The Supreme Court used assignment of income principles 578 in af-
firming the Tax Court's decision that the sale, in substance, had been
made by the corporation:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transac-
tion. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of
property are not finally to be determined solely by the means em-
ployed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be
viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of nego-
tiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one
person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale by an-
other by using the later as a conduit through which to pass title. To
permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere for-
malisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously
impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress.579
The fact that oral contracts for land were unenforceable under local
law and that the corporation had never executed a written contract
did not change the tax result.58 0
Court Holding raised difficult questions for taxpayers, the Service,
and lower courts. The Supreme Court sought to provide guidance five
years later in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,581 a case
in which it granted certiorari "to clear up doubts arising out of the
573. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).




578. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 26, at 298 ("The question of who in substance is the seller
of property may seem outside the field of assignment of income, but, if so, it is close by and must
be referred to frequently.").
579. Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 334 (footnote omitted).
580. Id.
581. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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Court Holding Co. case." 582 In Cumberland, shareholders of a corpo-
ration had offered to sell corporate stock that they owned.5 83 An in-
terested party refused to buy the stock but offered to purchase some
of the corporation's assets.58 4 That offer was rejected by the corpora-
tion because of the high capital gain tax that would have resulted had
it made the sale.585 The corporation subsequently distributed the as-
sets to its shareholders who sold the assets to the buyer.586 The issue
was whether the corporation should be taxed on the gain.5 87
The Supreme Court summarized its decision in Court Holding as
follows:
Our Court Holding Co. decision rested on findings of fact by the
Tax Court that a sale had been made and gains realized by the tax-
payer corporation. There the corporation had negotiated for sale of
its assets and had reached an oral agreement of sale. When the tax
consequences of the corporate sale were belatedly recognized, the
corporation purported to 'call off the sale at the last minute and
distributed the physical properties in kind to the shareholders.
They promptly conveyed these properties to the same persons who
had negotiated with the corporation.588
The Court cautioned that Court Holding did not mean that a corpora-
tion would be taxed where a sale was made by shareholders following
a genuine liquidation and dissolution.5 89 Whether a liquidation was
genuine or a sham is a question of fact 590 and "in resolving such ques-
tions as who made a sale, fact-finding tribunals in tax cases can con-
sider motives, intent, and conduct in addition to what appears in the
written instruments used by the parties to control rights as among
themselves."5 91 The fact that sales followed tax-motivated liquida-
tions would not cause the corporation to be taxed as long as the subse-
quent sales were in fact made by the shareholders. 592
Congress enacted section 337 in 1954 to permit corporations to
avoid the Court Holding problem in the case of certain complete cor-
porate liquidations. 593 Section 337 permitted shareholders to avoid
582. Id. at 453.
583. Id. at 452.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 453.
587. Id. at 452.
588. Id. at 453-54.
589. id. at 454.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 454 n.3.
592. Id. at 455.
593. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 26, at 399.
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taxation at the corporate level and be taxed on liquidations at capital
gains rates.594 Congress repealed section 337 in 1986.595
The Court Holding doctrine can arise in a multitude of factual set-
tings. The issue in such cases is whether negotiations or arrangements
made for the sale of property had reached the point after which the
transfer of legal title was, in substance, not a transfer of property, but
of a right to receive sale proceeds.596 As the Supreme Court held in
Court Holding, "[a] sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax
purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit
through which to pass title. '597
1. Negotiations-No Contract
Assignment of Income
In Court Holding, the Court held that "each step, from the com-
mencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is rele-
vant" in determining who made a particular sale.598 It did not hold,
however, that mere commencement of negotiations always causes a
subsequent sale to be treated as a sale by the owner who initiated the
negotiations. Factors relevant to identifying the seller have been said
to include "previous 'arrangements' or 'negotiations' for the sale con-
ducted by the donor, close proximity of the sale to the gift, and the
presence of a binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the
donee to complete the sale." 599 However, two cases illustrate that
courts are unlikely to find a Court Holding problem if no understand-
ing or agreement to sell existed at the time of transfer.
In Indiana Limestone Co. v. Smith,600 the district court rejected the
I.R.S.'s contention that a sale of real property by a corporation should
have been taxed as a sale by a prior owner.60 1 Although the prior
owner had conducted negotiations for sale of the property to its even-
tual purchaser, the court found that, at the time of the conveyance, the
"negotiations had not reached a point where the sale ... was assured
594. Id. at 388. Courts continued to confront assignment of income issues in connection with
corporate liquidations after the enactment of section 337. The question, however, was not
whether the corporation recognized gain, but whether shareholders who transferred stock after
adoption of liquidation plans would be taxed when the liquidation was completed. See supra
Part V.C.
595. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2269.
596. See FERouSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:50.
597. 324 U.S. at 334.
598. Id.
599. Eustice, supra note 26, at 37.
600. 85 F. Supp. 652 (S.D. Ind. 1949).
601. Id. at 655.
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or even substantially assured; that on that date there was no sale con-
tract, nor was there any understanding ... that the [property] would
subsequently be conveyed. '602
Another court made a similar factual determination in Martin v.
Machiz.60 3 A husband and wife, who had been negotiating to sell cer-
tain stock, conveyed 1,000 of 1,440 shares to trustees of a charitable
trust.60 4 Two days later, the taxpayers, individually, and the trustees
executed a contract to sell all 1,440 shares.60 5 The I.R.S. sought to tax
the couple on the capital gains realized on the sale of all shares on the
grounds that "the trust was a mere conduit through which taxpayers
consummated an agreement of sale arrived at before the trust as a
legal entity came into being."606 The court disagreed.60 7 It found that
"at the time the deed of trust was executed no mutual understanding
or meeting of the minds or contract existed between the parties. ' 608
The charitable trust, consequently, made the sale of the shares that
had been transferred to it in substance as well as in form.609
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Not surprisingly, no case or ruling has been found which holds that
the proceeds of a sale completed after a decedent's death were income
in respect of a decedent because of a decedent's negotiations absent
either a contract negotiated by the decedent or a delivery by which
property was placed beyond the decedent's control and entitled him
to receive sales proceeds.610 Persons who acquire legal title to prop-
erty in such cases no doubt claim a section 1014 basis in the property
when reporting a post-death sale. Even if the successor's return is
audited, it is unlikely that the I.R.S. would contend the proceeds were
IRD in such circumstances without evidence that the successor had
merely completed a sale which had been negotiated and agreed to by
the decedent.
An example in the regulations supports that conclusion. In the ex-
ample, a decedent commenced negotiations to sell apples to Y before
602. Id.
603. 251 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1966).
604. Id. at 383.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 386.
607. Id. at 390.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. See Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 681 n.12 (8th Cir. 1981) ("If the
decedent neither enters into a sales contract nor delivers the property before death, the post-
death disposition of the property by the executor does not produce income in respect of a
decedent.").
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his death, "but did not complete the sale before his death. '611 The
decedent's executor completed the sale and transferred the apples to
y612 Although the facts are sparse, it appears that the decedent had
not reached an understanding or agreement of the type found to exist
in Court Holding. Consistent with the results in assignment of income
cases, the regulation provides that none of the post-death proceeds of
the sale to Y were income in respect of a decedent.613
2. Executory Contracts
Assignment of Income
Four cases illustrate application of assignment of income principles
where property is gratuitously transferred after execution of a binding
contract and the transferee completes the sale.
On August 6, 1960, two individuals executed a written contract to
sell real property.614 Two days later, one of them deeded the real
property to a corporation wholly owned by the taxpayers. 615 The cor-
poration completed the sale under the contract on October 10,
1960.616 In Palmer v. Commissioner,617 the Tax Court found the facts
before it presented a stronger case for the I.R.S. than those in Court
Holding.618 Viewing the transaction as a whole, the court held the
individual taxpayer had made the sale.619 The First Circuit affirmed,
holding the evidence permitted the Tax Court to reasonably find that
the taxpayer had made the sale before the transfer.620
In Usher v. Commissioner,621 stock was transferred to an irrevoca-
ble trust after the shareholder had entered into a "Memorandum of
Understanding" in which she agreed to sell the stock.622 The trust
completed the sale pursuant to the memorandum several weeks after
the transfer.623 The Tax Court held the transferor taxable on the pro-
ceeds.624 It found she had been bound to sell her stock under the
memorandum, the trust was not free to dispose of the stock, and the
611. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) ex. (5)(i) (1957).
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Palmer v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 92, 93, affd, 354 F.2d 974 (1st Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
615. Id.
616. Id. at 94.
617. Id. at 92.
618. Id. at 95.
619. Id.
620. Palmer v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 974, 975 (1st Cir. 1965).
621. 45 T.C. 205 (1965).
622. Id. at 206.
623. Id. at 212.
624. Id. at 215.
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trust was a mere conduit to carry out the taxpayer's previously con-
tracted-for sale.62 5 The fact that the contract was subject to confirma-
tion of the financial condition and net worth of the corporation did
not change that result.626 The taxpayer was held to have enjoyed the
benefits of the proceeds "as completely as she would have had she in
form collected the proceeds of the sale and transferred them to the
trust."
627
On July 24, 1963, Susie Salvatore accepted an offer from Texaco,
Inc. to purchase property that she owned.628 By warranty deed dated
August 28, 1963, she conveyed a one-half interest in the property to
her five children.629 Salvatore and her children conveyed title to Tex-
aco by warranty deeds dated August 28 and 30, 1963.630 In Salvatore
v. Commissioner,631 the Tax Court concluded that Salvatore, notwith-
standing the intermediate conveyance, was taxable on the entire gain
from the sale because "[i]n substance, petitioner made an anticipatory
assignment to her children of one-half of the income from the sale of
the property. '632 Her transfer of the one-half interest, although a
completed gift for gift tax purposes, was merely an intermediate step
in the transfer of title to Texaco pursuant to the contract.633 The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, finding substantial support existed for the Tax
Court's conclusion.634
The 1986 case of Peterson v. Commissioner635 required the Tax
Court to determine whether a donor, who had given stock to his chil-
dren, should be taxed on the gain from the stock's sale under a con-
tract he had made three months earlier.636 The court extensively
reviewed applicable principles. 637 Citing corporate liquidating distri-
bution cases (Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones),638 the court concluded:
Whether a taxpayer possesses a right to receive income or gain is, of
course, a question of fact, each case turning on its own particular
facts. The realities and substance of the events, rather than formali-
ties and the technical possibility that the sale might be abandoned,
625. Id. at 215-16.
626. Id. at 215.
627. Id. at 216.
628. Salvatore v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, 90, affd, 434 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1970).
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, affd, 434 F.2d 600 (2d. Cir. 1970).
632. Id. at 91.
633. Id.
634. Salvatore v. Commissioner, 434 F.2d 600, 601 (2d Cir. 1970).
635. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1987).
636. Id. at 1314.
637. Id. at 1314-16.
638. See supra Part V.C (discussing these cases in full).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
must govern our determination of whether an anticipatory assign-
ment of income occurred. We must determine whether by the time
of the gifts, the sale was practically certain to be completed despite
the remote and hypothetical possibility of abandonment.639
The court then carefully considered several contingencies relied upon
by the taxpayers as negating the transferor's right to the proceeds at
the time of the gift. 640 It found none of them sufficient to negate the
transferor's right.641 Finding the sale "practically certain to be com-
pleted" at the time of the stock transfer, the gain was taxable to the
taxpayer who had made the contract because his right to the proceeds
"had sufficiently matured or ripened so that the gifts were in sub-
stance gifts of the sale proceeds rather than the stock itself. '642
Income in Respect of a Decedent
Commissioner v. Linde643 did not involve post-death completion of
a sale under an executory contract made by a decedent. It did, how-
ever, require the court to characterize post-death sales proceeds. The
decedent had delivered grapes to several cooperative marketing as-
sociations during his life.644 The cooperatives were to process the
grapes into wine, sell the products, and distribute the net proceeds to
their members. 645 Wine made from the grapes delivered by the dece-
dent had not been sold at the time of his death.646 The Ninth Circuit
held, nonetheless, that the post-death sale proceeds constituted in-
come in respect of a decedent. 647 The decedent's delivery (activity)
had converted his property into a right to receive sale proceeds-"all
he had remaining was a right to collect sums of money." 648 The dece-
dent's successors did not receive section 1014 property but the right to
receive sale proceeds that eventually would be realized. 649
In Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross,650 the Fifth Circuit used the "right
to income" test to characterize proceeds of a sale completed after
death pursuant to a contract made by the decedent.651 By contract
639. Peterson, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1316 (citations omitted).
640. Id. at 1316-19.
641. Id. at 1319.
642. Id.
643. 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954).
644. Id. at 2.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 3.
647. Id.
648. Id. at 7.
649. Id.
650. 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
651. Id. at 696.
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dated August 4, 1960, the decedent and others had agreed to sell stock
or assets of certain corporations.652 The transaction was to close Janu-
ary 3, 1961, but the closing was extended to March 1, 1961, pursuant to
a right granted to the buyer in the contract.653 The decedent died Jan-
uary 30, 1961.654 The transaction closed February 23, 1961, with the
decedent's successor receiving the sale proceeds.655
The Fifth Circuit held the proceeds were income in respect of a de-
cedent because the decedent had possessed a right to the sale pro-
ceeds at the time of his death.656 Although the decedent's executor
had to do certain things to perform the contract, the court held that
they "were not of such scope as would negate the right which was his
under the contract. ' 657 The Fifth Circuit, thus, seemed to agree with
the trial court's finding that unfulfilled conditions of the contract were
of "no material affect" and that the estate's acts were "perfunctory
and of no material significance. '658 A contrary holding that post-
death ministerial acts preclude characterization of proceeds as IRD
would have meant that decedents must possess an unqualified right to
the income at death in order for the proceeds to be IRD.659
In Revenue Ruling 78-32,660 the I.R.S. considered whether proceeds
of a sale completed after death pursuant to a contract entered by the
decedent were income in respect of a decedent.661 On January 1,
1976, the decedent had executed a real estate contract that was to
close on March 15, 1976.662 The decedent died on February 5, 1976,
after substantial fulfillment of the prerequisites to the sale.663 Re-
maining obligations of the seller were characterized as ministerial.664
The executor completed the transaction and transferred title and pos-
session on March 15, 1976.665 On these facts, the I.R.S. ruled that the
decedent was "unconditionally entitled to the proceeds of the sale at
652. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 901 (N.D. Ga. 1966), affd on other grounds,
392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
653. Id. at 902-03.
654. Id. at 903.
655. Id. at 904.
656. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
657. Id.
658. Trust Co. of Ga, 262 F. Supp. at 909.
659. See Brown, supra note 13, at 226-27.







the time of death" and the gain realized was income in respect of a
decedent.666
In Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner,667 the court had to determine
whether proceeds of a sale completed after a decedent's death were
income in respect of a decedent. 668 Peterson entered a contract on
July 11, 1972, agreeing to sell approximately 3,300 calves. 669 Peterson
died November 9, 1972, without having completed the transaction.670
His estate raised and fed the cattle and made delivery in December of
1972.671
The Tax Court articulated a four-factor test for determining
whether the decedent possessed a right to income at death.672 The
second requirement of that test was that the "decedent has performed
the substantive (nonministerial) acts required of him as preconditions
to the sale, i.e., the subject matter of the sale was in a deliverable state
on the date of the decedent's death. '673 It held that the nature of the
decedent's activities depends on the subject matter of the sale.674 One
indicator of whether the decedent had performed the substantive acts
was whether he had delivered or otherwise placed the subject of the
sale beyond his control.675 The court cautioned, however, that the ab-
sence of delivery does not preclude a finding that sales proceeds are
IRD.676 The court held the second requirement had not been satisfied
in Estate of Peterson-only two-thirds of the calves were deliverable at
the decedent's death. 677 The acts of the estate in raising and feeding
the calves "were not perfunctory or ministerial but substantive and
essential acts not performed by the decedent prior to his death. '678
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Estate of
Peterson.679 It agreed with the Tax Court that the estate's perform-
ance of the contract, which it held involved the care, feeding, and de-
livery of the calves, could not be characterized as ministerial. 680 The
666. Id. at 199.
667. 74 T.C. 630 (1980), affd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
668. Id. at 635.
669. Id. at 631.
670. Id. at 634.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 639; see supra Part lII.C.2.b.
673. Estate of Peterson, 74 T.C. at 640.
674. Id.
675. Id.
676. Id. at 641.
677. Id. at 644.
678. Id.
679. Estate of Peterson v, Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
680. Id. at 681.
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Eighth Circuit disagreed, however, with the Tax Court's conclusion
that characterization of the tasks depends on the nature of the prop-
erty.681 It suggested that delivery may be a substantive and, therefore,
determinative act in all cases involving sales of property.682 However,
if the character of sales proceeds depends on whether the subject of
the sale had been delivered during the decedent's life, rather than on
whether it was deliverable, only completed sales for which the dece-
dent had not received payment would give rise to income in respect of
a decedent.
The I.R.S. published Revenue Ruling 82-1683 eighteen days after the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Estate of Peterson. It addressed facts simi-
lar to those in Revenue Ruling 78-32.684 A taxpayer had entered into
a binding executory contract to sell his residence but died before the
sale was completed. 685 Prior to the taxpayer's death, contractual con-
ditions had been substantially fulfilled and only ministerial obligations
remained to be performed.686 The decedent's executor completed the
sale and delivered possession.687 The I.R.S. ruled the sale proceeds
were income in respect of a decedent to the extent not excluded from
income by section 121.688 The ruling evidences the Service's belief
that delivery is ministerial, rather than substantive, as suggested by
the Eighth Circuit in Estate of Peterson.689
Private Letter Ruling 90-23-012690 sheds light on what the I.R.S.
considers to be a material contingency. A taxpayer had entered into a
contract to sell real estate that provided either party could cancel the
contract if the buyer did not obtain a mortgage within forty-five
days.691 The taxpayer died during the forty-five day period, and the
buyer did not obtain a mortgage commitment during this forty-five
day period.692 Nonetheless, the executor of the decedent's estate and
the buyer closed the transaction without a written contract exten-
sion. 693 The I.R.S. ruled that the post-death proceeds were IRD, not-
ing that Treasury Regulations provide that income in respect of a
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Rev. Rul. 82-1, 1982-1 C.B. 26.
684. Rev. Rul. 78-32, 1978-1 C.B. 198.




689. See Blattmachr, supra note 16, at 49.





decedent includes income "to which the decedent had a contingent
claim at the time of his death. '694
In 1992, the Tax Court used the first two factors of its four-factor
test to classify post-death sales proceeds in Estate of Napolitano v.
Commissioner.695 Napolitano had entered into a contract to sell prop-
erty for $100,000, on April 8, 1985.696 The contract required that the
property be conveyed free of any violations of local law.697 At the
time of Napolitano's death, three violations existed that had not been
resolved.698 After Napolitano's death, the attorney for the purchaser
indicated that title would not be taken subject to the violations. 699
Post-death negotiations, however, resulted in a $2,250 price reduction
and the transfer of the property subject to the violations on July 30,
1985.700
The Tax Court held the post-death proceeds were not income in
respect of a decedent because the second prong of its four-factor right
to income test had not been satisfied.701 The decedent had not per-
formed all the substantive (nonministerial) acts required as precondi-
tions to the sale; consequently, the property was not in a deliverable
state on the date of death because of the uncorrected violations.702
Although the Tax Court noted that not all acts required of a seller
must be completed at death in order for post-death payments to con-
stitute IRD, the court held that remaining acts must be ministerial
rather than substantive.703 It concluded that the post-death negotia-
tions that resolved the violation problem "demanded judgment and
discretion, and cannot be considered 'ministerial,' perfunctory, rou-
tine, or insubstantial. '704 Since substantive acts remained to be com-
pleted at the decedent's death, the court held he had no right to
income at death.705
If donative assignment of income cases were referenced in deciding
whether proceeds of sales completed after death are income in respect
of a decedent, the "practical certainty of receipt" test would be
694. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b)).
695. 61 T.C.M. (RIA) 1633 (1992).
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 1634.
699. Id.
700. Id.
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used.70 6 For example, in Private Letter Ruling 90-23-012,707 at the de-
cedent's death, was it practically certain that the buyer would obtain
the required financing? The trier of fact would consider factors rele-
vant to that question in deciding whether the decedent had a right to
income under section 691. Similarly, in Napolitano, at the decedent's
death, was it practically certain that the sale would be consummated
notwithstanding the uncorrected violations? The relatively small
price-reduction made after his death to complete the transaction sug-
gests he may have had the necessary right to income. A likelihood of
receipt analysis should be used to determine whether "earned" in-
come (sale proceeds) or property was transferred in both the assign-
ment of income and income in respect of a decedent settings when
property is transferred after execution of a contract.
3. Installment Sales
The amount of gain realized on the sale or disposition of property
includes money and the fair market value of other property re-
ceived.708 Generally, the entire amount of gain realized is recognized
for income tax purposes.70 9 However, Congress permits taxpayers to
report income from installment sales under the installment method
provided in section 453.710 Section 453, nonetheless, defers only taxa-
tion of gain, not its realization.71'
Assignment of Income
Congress has specifically addressed the income tax consequences of
transferring installment obligations. Section 453B generally provides
that if an installment obligation is "distributed, transmitted, sold, or
otherwise disposed of, gain or loss shall result to the extent of the
difference between the basis of the obligation and.., the fair market
value of the obligation at the time of distribution, transmission, or dis-
position" in cases not involving a sale or exchange. 712 A gratuitous
assignment of an installment obligation is a disposition which triggers
taxation. 713
706. See Peterson v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300, 1316 (1986), affd, 822 F.2d 1093
(8th Cir. 1987).
707. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-23-012 (Mar. 6, 1990).
708. I.R.C. § 1001(b).
709. Id. § 1001(c).
710. Id. § 453.
711. Sun First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 607 F.2d 1347, 1353 (Ct. CI. 1979).
712. I.R.C. § 453B(a).
713. See id.
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Income in Respect of a Decedent
Section 691(a)(4) provides that installment obligations acquired by
reason of a decedent's death constitute income in respect of a dece-
dent in an amount equal to the excess of the face amount over dece-
dent's basis.714 The transfer of installment obligations at death,
however, does not usually cause immediate recognition of gain be-
cause Congress excepted the transmission of installment obligations at
death from the disposition rules, except as provided in section 691.715
Section 691 provides for treating two events as transfers causing
recognition of income. First, section 691(a)(5)(A)(i) provides that the
transfer of an installment obligation to its obligor will be a transfer
under section 691(a)(2). 716 Second, section 691(a)(5)(A)(ii) provides
that any cancellation of an installment obligation is treated as a trans-
fer.717 Additionally, any cancellation occurring at a decedent's death
is to be treated as a transfer by the decedent's estate.718
In Frane v. Commissioner,719 the Eighth Circuit held the automatic
self-cancellation of an installment obligation at death pursuant to the
terms of the note is a "cancellation" covered by sections 453B and
691(a)(5). 720 The court also addressed the question of whether the
income triggered by the cancellation is taxable to the decedent or his
estate. 72' It held that the unambiguous language of section
691(a)(5)(A)(iii) provided that a cancellation occurring at death is to
be treated as a transfer by the estate taxable under section
691(a)(2). 722 Consequently, the decedent's estate, not the decedent,
was taxable upon the income triggered by the cancellation. 72 3
4. Sales that Can Close Only After Transfer
Assignment of Income
In Revenue Ruling 60-370,724 the I.R.S. extended Court Holding to
a situation where the transferor had not even commenced negotia-
tions to sell property. 72 5 An individual transferred appreciated prop-
714. Id. § 691(a)(4).
715. Id. § 453B(c).
716. Id. § 691(a)(5)(A)(i).
717. Id. § 691(a)(5)(A)(ii).
718. Id. § 691(a)(5)(A)(iii).
719. 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993).




724. Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960-2 C.B. 203.
725. Id. at 205.
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erty to a university, as trustee, of a charitable remainder trust.726 Net
income was payable to the donor for life and, after his death, to a
secondary income beneficiary for life.727 The remainder would pass to
the university after the death of both beneficiaries. 728 The trustee, as
expressly required by the terms of the trust instrument, either sold the
appreciated property and invested the proceeds in tax-exempt securi-
ties or exchanged the property for tax-exempt securities.729
The I.R.S. ruled that the gain from the disposition of the property
was includible in the gross income of the donor in the year of the sale
or exchange. 730 Because of the obligation imposed on the trustee, the
I.R.S. concluded that "the transferor did not give the trustee appreci-
ated property to hold in trust, but, rather, gave the trustee the pro-
ceeds of the sale or exchange of the property which the trustee was
required to consummate."' 731 Although the trust instrument ad-
dressed in the ruling expressly required the disposition of the prop-
erty, the Service ruled an obligation to dispose of contributed
property can also arise by implication.732
Thirty-four years later, the I.R.S., in Notice 94-78, 733 stated it may
rely on assignment of income principles and Revenue Ruling 60-370
to challenge the use of certain short-term charitable remainder uni-
trusts.734 It gave an example of the type of transaction it considered
abusive.735 Appreciated, nonproductive property having a value of
$1,000,000 and a zero basis is contributed to a two-year charitable re-
mainder unitrust on January 1.736 The unitrust amount under the in-
strument is "80% of the fair market value of the trust assets valued
annually. '737 No distribution is made in the first year.738
All assets are sold at the beginning of the second year for
$1,000,000. 7 3 9 The trustee, thereafter, pays the donor $800,000 (80% x
$1,000,000), the unitrust amount for the first year, $160,000 (80% x




730. Id. at 205.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. I.R.S. Notice 94-78, 1994-2 C.B. 555.







$200,000), the unitrust amount for the second year, and distributes the
$40,000 balance to the charitable organization. 740
Noting that proponents of such planning contend the $800,000 dis-
tribution to the donor is tax-free, the Service indicated it would chal-
lenge such transactions using one or more legal doctrines. 741 One of
those doctrines is the assignment of income doctrine under which "the
income of one person cannot be assigned to another for tax pur-
poses. '"742 Since the trustee of the short-term trust was required to
dispose of the appreciated property in a taxable transaction to comply
with the terms of the trust (either through a sale or distribution in
kind to the donor), the Service gave notice that the gain realized upon
the trust's sale of the assets may be attributed to the donor as in Reve-
nue Ruling 60-370. 743
Revenue Ruling 60-370 and Notice 94-78 both involved the re-
quired sale of appreciated property in circumstances where the donor
retained rights to receive distributions. However, the importance of
the donor's retained interests is unclear. The Service may not con-
sider it very important. The assignment of income doctrine seeks to
determine the nature of the item transferred. Did the donor transfer
"earned" income (sale proceeds) or appreciated property? In Reve-
nue Ruling 60-370, the Service ruled that a donor-imposed obligation
to sell meant the transferor did not give the trustee appreciated prop-
erty but merely the proceeds of a sale that the donee was required to
make.744 The Service's theory is that the donee, after the mandated
sale is completed, is in the same position he would have been had the
donor sold the property and gifted the proceeds. 745 Since the donor
did not give his donee control over the decision of whether to retain
or sell the property, the Service determined it was appropriate to tax
the donor on the gain realized.746
Income in Respect of a Decedent
The legislative history of section 691 contains an example which
suggests that the proceeds of sales negotiated by decedents that will
close only after death would be income in respect of a decedent:
Another example [of the application of this provision] is the case of
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est in certain partnership assets shall pass to the surviving partners
in exchange for payments to be made by them to his widow. On his
death, the payments by the surviving partners shall be included in
the widow's income to the extent they represent the gain on such
sale. 74
7
The critical factor not addressed in the example, however, was how
the "gain" was to be computed. Was the decedent's basis or a section
1014 basis to be used? Congress must have had the decedent's basis in
mind, however, otherwise there would have been no gain upon the
sale at death.
The Treasury included this example in the first regulations issued to
deal with income in respect of a decedent.7 48 Depending on one's
view, however, the Treasury either clarified or expanded upon the ex-
ample by providing that the payments "must be included in the
widow's income to the extent they exceeded the adjusted basis of such
assets in the hands of the decedent immediately prior to his death." 749
Two years later, however, the Treasury did an about-face. It deleted
the quoted language and provided that the payments were to be in-
cluded "in the widow's income to the extent they are attributable to
the earnings of the partnership accrued only by reason of his
death.' 750
Current regulations provide that proceeds of a mandatory post-
death sale of stock pursuant to an agreement made by a decedent are
not income in respect of a decedent:
A, prior to his death, acquired 10,000 shares of the capital stock
of the X Corporation at a cost of $100 per share. During his life-
time, A had entered into an agreement with X Corporation
whereby X Corporation agreed to purchase and the decedent
agreed that his executor would sell the 10,000 shares of X Corpora-
tion stock owned by him at the book value of the stock at the date
of A's death. Upon A's death, the shares are sold by A's executor
for $500 a share pursuant to the agreement. Since the sale of stock
is consummated after A's death, there is no income in respect of a
decedent with respect to the appreciation in value of A's stock to
the date of his death. If, in this example, A had in fact sold the
stock during his lifetime but payment had not been received before
his death, any gain on the sale would constitute income in respect of
a decedent when the proceeds were received.75'
747. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 436; S. REP. No. 77-1631
(1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 580.
748. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.126-1, T.D. 5233, 1943-1 C.B. 198, 205.
749. Id.
750. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.126-1, T.D. 5459, 1945-1 C.B. 193.
751. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), ex. (4) (1957).
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Mandatory buy-sell agreements, so frequently used in closely held
corporations, consequently, do not create income in respect of a dece-
dent problems.
But why are not the proceeds of mandatory post-death sales income
in respect of a decedent? 752
Should the fact that the decedent could never have received the
proceeds mean they are not income in respect of a decedent? As pre-
viously discussed, 753 the fact that compensation-related payments
could never have been received by the decedent does not affect their
status as income in respect of a decedent. The decedent's economic
activities were held to have created the necessary right to income for
purposes of section 691. The proceeds of a mandatory sale at death,
similarly, are solely attributable to the decedent's economic activities
in negotiating the contract.
Is a different tax result in the sales context warranted because a
realization event (transfer of title or delivery) is generally required
before a right to sales proceeds will be found to exist? Trust Co. of
Georgia, however, makes it clear that a sale need not be completed at
death in order for sale proceeds to be income in respect of a decedent
as long as remaining acts are ministerial. The actions of the dece-
dent's estate in completing the sale of stock under a mandatory buy-
sell agreement would clearly be ministerial, unless delivery is always a
substantive act as suggested by the Eighth Circuit in Estate of
Peterson.
If Revenue Ruling 60-370 is correct, consistent taxation of items
transferred during life and at death would require the conclusion that
the decedent did not transfer appreciated property, but the proceeds
of a sale the executor was required to complete. If income in respect
of a decedent is determined on the basis of the nature of the item
transferred at death, it would appear the decedent merely transferred
the right to receive the proceeds of a sale he had arranged. Viewed
from the estate's perspective, although it received legal title to prop-
erty, it merely had a right to the proceeds under the binding contract.
752. Commentators have disagreed as to the correctness of the Treasury's position. See, e.g.,
FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:52-53 (suggesting the proceeds are not income in respect of
a decedent because the decedent possessed the benefits and burdens of ownership at death);
Brown, supra note 13, at 230 (questioning the Treasury position and suggesting the decedent
possessed a conditional right to the income during his life); Note, Sales Transactions and Income
in Respect of a Decedent, supra note 311, at 620 (suggesting "it may prove impossible or undesir-
able for the Commissioner to attempt to rationalize" the result in the regulations).
753. See supra Part V.B.3.
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5. Transferee Breach or Rescission
What tax consequences should result if a transferee of property
breaches or participates in the rescission of an executory contract
made by the transferor and later sells the property? Assume for pur-
poses of this discussion that all that remains to be done under the
contract at the time of the transfer are ministerial acts (transfer of title
and delivery of possession) and that no material economic contingen-
cies exist.
Assignment of Income
The issue presented by the assumed facts in the assignment of in-
come context is not whether the gain will be taxed, but who is the
proper taxpayer to be taxed when the sale is made. The Court Hold-
ing doctrine prevents the sale of property by one taxpayer from being
converted into a sale by another for tax purposes. If that doctrine
does not apply, the transferee will be taxed on the sale and will deter-
mine gain by reference to the donor's adjusted basis by virtue of sec-
tion 1015's carryover basis rules.
No donative assignment of income cases have been found in which
this issue has arisen. The tax consequences, however, should depend
on the substance, not the form, of the transaction. If the transferee
and the buyer rescind the contract at the prompting of the donor and,
within a relatively short period of time, engage in a sales transaction
on substantially the same terms as those under the original contract,
the donor should be taxed on the gain from the sale. However, if the
contract is rescinded and the transferee sells the property five years
later to a different buyer upon substantially different terms, the donor
should not be taxed on the gain. Between these extremes courts
should consider all relevant facts in determining who should be taxed
on the gain.
Income in Respect of a Decedent
The issue presented by the assumed facts in the income in respect of
a decedent context is not who will be taxed, but whether any income
exists to be taxed after breach or rescission. Consequently, the stakes
are much higher in this context than in the assignment of income
setting.
It has long been recognized that income in respect of a decedent
that would result from completion of sales under executory contracts
might be avoided if the decedent's successor breaches or participates
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in rescission of the contract.754 If such were the case, however, the law
would merely be a trap for the unwary. Well-advised successors who
breached or rescinded the original contract and renegotiated the sale
would report no gain. Ill-advised successors would complete the sale
under the original contract and be taxed on income in respect of a
decedent. While well-advised taxpayers no doubt pay less tax than ill-
advised taxpayers as a general rule, it would be poor tax policy to
permit that result in this context. Notwithstanding the fact that tax-
payers have the right to arrange their affairs to reduce or minimize
taxes, they should not be permitted to do so by retroactively
recharacterizing items acquired at death.
Although a successor's actions in breaching or participating in a re-
scission should not be considered a taxable event,755 the important
question after such an action concerns the successor's basis. The lead-
ing commentators conclude that if the decedent's successor rescinds a
contract, holds the property free of any obligation to sell and later
sells to an unrelated party, "[slection 1014(c) does not apply in such a
case, and the successor computes gain or loss by reference to his or
her basis in the property under § 1014(a). '756
Income in respect of a decedent, however, is determined as of the
moment of death based upon the facts existing at that time.757 No
actions on the part of the decedent's successor can change the nature
of the item transferred at death.758 If an item constitutes income in
respect of a decedent, it does not receive a section 1014(a) basis be-
cause of section 1014(c). If a successor breaches or rescinds a con-
tract, section 1014(c) is not thereby suspended and section 1014(a) is
754. See, e.g., FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:61; Gordon, supra note 311, at 37-38;
Verbit, supra note 238, at 435; Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126,
supra note 31, at 1030; Note, Tax Effect of Executor's Rescission and Renegotiation of Decedent's
Contracts, 51 MINN. L. REv. 251, 254 (1966). Commentators have also suggested that the prob-
lem can be avoided by including in the contract a provision nullifying the contract in the event of
the death of the seller prior to closing. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 13, at 243; Verbit, supra note
238, at 439.
755. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:61 ("[I]t seems doubtful that gain or loss occurs on
a rescission that simply abnegates a previous arrangement that itself has not ripened into a taxa-
ble event."); Note, Tax Effect of Executor's Rescission and Renegotiation of Decedent's Contracts,
supra note 754, at 254 ("Where this right to receive income is canceled, rather than donated or
sold, the estate has received no benefit from its mere possession of the right; therefore, rescission
of the contract should not be considered a 'transfer."').
756. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 3:61.
757. Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 880 n. 4 (1976), affd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th
Cir. 1977); see Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 676-78 (8th Cir. 1981); Keck v.
Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1969); Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 696 (5th
Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
758. Estate of Sidles, 65 T.C. at 880 n.4 ("Whatever actions the estate or Bi-State's board of
directors could have taken after decedent's death are not material here.").
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not applied retroactively. The successor's basis in the property is
equal to the decedent's adjusted basis on date of death-the amount
of the sale proceeds that would not have been income in respect of a
decedent.
Taxation of a successor who breaches or rescinds a contract and
later sells the property would depend on the particular facts and the
substance of the transaction. If the successor and the buyer rescind
the contract and, within a relatively short period of time, engage in a
sales transaction on substantially the same terms as those under the
original contract, the proceeds should be taxed as income in respect of
a decedent and the post-death actions should be disregarded. How-
ever, if the contract is rescinded and the transferee sells the property
five years later to a different buyer upon substantially different terms,
the donor should be taxed on gain under section 61 and the gain de-
termined by reference to the decedent's adjusted basis on the date of
death. Between these extremes courts should consider all relevant
facts in determining how the gain should be taxed. The important
point, however, is that the successor acquired an item of income in
respect of a decedent and nothing the successor can do after death will
serve to obtain a section 1014(a) basis for the successor.
The suggested result is consistent with taxation of the hypothetical
breach or rescission in the assignment of income context. On the as-
sumed facts, the transfer, whether during life or at death, was of a
right to income, not of property. Consequently, nothing the donee
(assignment of income) or successor (income in respect of a decedent)
can do should permit the transferee to avoid taxation of the income
upon a subsequent sale.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have struggled for more than fifty years to develop tests and
articulate factors to be used to identify income in respect of a dece-
dent under section 691. Although the courts, in large part, have cor-
rectly classified post-death receipts, application of the various tests
has challenged taxpayers, the I.R.S., and the courts.
Income in respect of a decedent should be identified by using fac-
tors employed in donative assignment of income cases and in a man-
ner consistent with the results in those cases. Both involve the same
inquiry-was "earned" income or property transferred? If a dece-
dent, immediately before death, could not have transferred an item
without triggering the assignment of income doctrine, the item is in-
come in respect of a decedent if transferred at death. If a decedent
could have transferred an item free of the assignment doctrine during
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life, the item is property entitled to a section 1014 basis if transferred
at death.
Use of donative assignment of income precedents to identify in-
come in respect of a decedent will not always provide clear and unfail-
ing guidance. Application of assignment of income principles is not
always easy or consistent.759 However, reference to that body of law
to identify income in respect of a decedent will result in comparable
treatment of earned income transferred during life and at death. Con-
sistent use of such an approach will achieve the congressional objec-
tive of reducing the importance of death in federal income taxation.
759. Eustice, supra note 26, at 1.
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